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Abstract 
This project delves into understanding how Denmark is affected by the current European sovereign 
debt crisis, given they have a fixed exchange rate against the Euro. It attempts to understand some 
of the recent institutional developments, like the Fiscal Compact, which have evolved in the wake 
of the Euro crisis. In addition we highlight some of the political and economic consequences 
Denmark may have, joining the Fiscal Compact,  through neo-functionalist concept of fiscal 
spillover and ‘optimum currency areas’.  
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MTO – Medium Term Objective 
MU – Monetary Union 
OCA – Optimum Currency Area theory 
OMT - Outright Monetary Transaction 
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TSCG - Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
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1.0 Problem field 
 
The effects of the Euro crisis have been many. The crisis has revealed that the level of convergence 
between Member States has caused fundamental, but also how the arrangement of the EMU 
institutional framework has largely been unable to secure an appropriate level of convergence of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) Member States.  The global financial crisis and market 
activity have over the recent years brought the issue of credibility, and how to ensure currency 
credibility, to the forefront of the European agenda. Coming to terms with these issues, the European 
Union has undergone an institutional makeover or development culminating in the Fiscal Compact in 
2012.  
The creation of European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
and the Fiscal Compact is the culmination of European Union policy-makers coming to terms with 
fundamental structural imperfections within the EMU construction. New institutional developments 
have resulted in increased surveillance and new assigned competences to the European institutions, a 
shift which can best be considered by understanding the concept of fiscal spill-over. However, the 
consequences of these spillovers have yet to be understood on a state level. In light of these 
developments, it is interesting to understand how Denmark is affected by developments within the 
Eurozone. 
The changes in market dynamics have been a reoccurring event throughout the global financial crisis 
and the Euro crisis that have had a negative effect on government bonds’ interest rates, thus forming 
a powerful form of pressure. The market behavior and powerful rating bureaus have incentivized 
closer convergence between Eurozone countries to re-establish the credibility of the Euro. The Fiscal 
Compact is a product of such pressures and actor’s wish to preserve the Euro. Main actor’s have 
been instrumental as carriers of further European integration.  
 
Denmark is a relatively peculiar case in EMU because of its euro opts out situation and fixed 
exchange rate against the Euro since its inception in 2000. Such a relationship entails a specific 
macroeconomic relationship between the Euro and the Danish krone (DKK). Denmark has not 
adopted the Euro and has little ability to influence institutional developments within the Eurozone, 
and yet somehow it is affected by the developments of the Euro crisis. In this context, it is quite 
interesting to investigate how Denmark has been affected by in particular the Fiscal Compact. 
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1.1 Problem formulation: 
How is Denmark affected by the European sovereign debt crisis and the decisional response to it, 
given they have a fixed exchange rate against the Euro? 
1.2 Research Questions: 
In order to best answer the problem formulation we have devised three research questions. These are 
intended to actively guide us in regard to our enquiry. Thus, we hope to answer the overall problem 
formulation by answering a series of sub question, which are mentioned below; 
 
1. In the wake of the Euro crisis, what mechanisms have been undertaken at the European and 
the Danish level to solve the crisis?  
2. What kind of spillovers emerge as a result of the pressures in the Euro crisis? 
3. How is Denmark affected by the Fiscal spillover? 
1.3 Project outline: 
Our intent with this project is primarily to answer the problem formulation, to do so we have 
established a number of sub-questions primarily intended to guide our further enquiry in to 
understanding not only recent institutional developments in the wake of the crisis but also 
understanding how these developments affect the fixed exchange rate policy used by Denmark.  Our 
project is structured around the sub-questions, where question one is primarily answered through the 
analytical framework and the remaining sub-questions will be the basis of our analysis. The 
following section will give an overall insight of our various aims and intent of the project, and what 
the various parts of this project are devised off. Central to the project is our analytical framework, 
which creates a framework for our analysis, with the intent of setting up and scoping our analysis. 
Combined, we will be able to make some overall political and economic conclusions regarding how 
the Danish choice of fixed exchange rate is affected by the current Euro crisis. 
1.4 Outline of the analytical framework: 
A key interest within this project has been to explain how recent European institutional 
developments have affected Denmark, indentifying the specific ties between the Euro and DKK and 
how Denmark partly is affected by the developments within the EMU, despite having little influence 
in these developments. The EMU structure has over the past few years undergone a make-over, ‘the 
extreme edition’, these developments have entailed the implementation, removal and restructuring of 
national barriers, and from our point of view, a highly integrative process at the European level. We 
argue that neo-functionalism provides a highly qualified platform to contextualize the recent 
developments. Our theoretical framework therefore builds on the notion that spillovers are central to 
understanding the problem formulation but also the basis on which we can address the three research 
questions. Secondly, to best understand the complexities of EMU framework and the Danish fixed 
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exchange rate policy it is instrumental to gain an understanding of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) 
theory. The setup of the EMU has been highly influenced by Robert Mundell’s (1961) work on OCA 
theory. The OCA theory is a prominent component to understanding the institutional set-up of the 
EMU, but also in understanding some the institutional flaws within the framework. The importance 
of fiscal imbalances is also explained by OCA theory, and provides a good insight to why 
institutional developments in the wake of crisis have been as they have. Combined these two theories 
provide an overarching theoretical framework for our investigation. 
 
In addition, a second dimension to our analytical framework is to provide an overview of the Euro 
crisis, considering both the affects and evolution from an EU perspective but also in a Danish 
perspective. The idea behind such a setup is to first set the Euro crisis within a context, and establish 
a theoretical understanding of EMU and the Euro crisis. In order to understand the affect on 
Denmark and their exchange rate mechanism, it is central to understand some of the overall 
dynamics in a European perspective. There is an assumptive notion that these have to be seen in 
context of each other, an assumption that OCA theory in particular supports.  
 
A third dimension of the analytical framework is directed toward, how OCA theory explains how a 
pegged fixed exchange rate system works especially in regard to economic developments in 
anchoring countries. Explaining this relation is also essential to understanding that the global 
financial crisis has diverging affects on Eurozone countries and Denmark, with differentiated 
consequences, as well as understanding the practical costs and benefits for Denmark by having a 
pegged exchange rate against the Euro.  
 
A fourth element of the analytical framework intends to identify central responses to the Euro crisis. 
Our focus is to identify some of the key institutional developments, which occurred as a result of the 
Euro crisis. To identify central issues they will be highlighted in this context, as these play a role in 
the developmental progress of European institutions, which is one of the main arguments within the 
neo-functionalist concept of spillovers (Niemann; 2006: 30-31). The diagram below is an illustrative 
overview of the analytical framework. 
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1.5 Outline of our analysis: 
The first part of our analysis will address our second research question and attempt to identify the 
various spillovers and pressures therein by reviewing the following: austerity measures, Fiscal 
Compact, transfer of competences and market dynamics pushing integration processes. The purpose 
is to determine whether or not cultivated, functional, political or combined spillovers occur at the EU 
level and how and if these spillovers together form a fiscal spillover. Our spillover argument 
concerns how the credibility of the Danish economy is tied to the Eurozone countries because of the 
fixed exchange rate agreement. An adoption of the Euro means that the monetary and exchange rate 
policy is delegated to the ECB. Since Denmark’s monetary policy goal is to fix the exchange rate 
with the Euro, the monetary policy cannot be used actively to stabilize business cycles
1
.  This leaves 
the structural and fiscal policy as the only economic tools remaining to stabilize business cycle 
situations, and ultimately ensure confidence in the economy, by preventing problems such as, 
accumulating debt, recession, shortage of liquidity, unemployment etc (functional spillover).  When 
pressures occur in the form of, for example, asymmetrical shocks, financial and market turbulence 
and economic interest group pressures, policy makers will have to coordinate centralized responses, 
which will as a consequence result in a spillover of policies into the fiscal and structural policy areas. 
The response to pressures will result in an increasing “need” for policy makers to coordinate 
centralized solutions to asymmetrical problems within a Monetary Union because they are 
interdependent on each economy within the Eurozone to ensure overall credibility in relation to 
                                                 
1 The recurring and fluctuating levels of economic activity that an economy experiences over a long 
period of time. The five stages of the business cycle are growth (expansion), peak, recession 
(contraction), trough and recovery. At one time, business cycles were thought to be extremely 
regular, with predictable durations, but today they are widely believed to be irregular, varying in 
frequency, magnitude and duration (Investopedia, Business cycle; (n.d.)) 
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keeping the Euro as a strong “reserve” currency (political spillover). Hence, tight economic policies 
on the EU level such as austerity; budget discipline and coordination can be observed as a 
coordinated central response to preserve the Euro credibility in a situation of Euro crisis and financial 
disturbance.  In such cases, the Member States in the EMU are pressured to delegate sovereignty to 
supranational institutions (transfer of competences, i.e. cultivated spillover) and limit their own 
economic tools because institutions are entrusted with competences to ensure that the coordinated 
Member State policies are executed according to the objective of ensuring internal stability (fiscal 
discipline), which should give the Euro higher credibility on international markets, resulting in 
accomplishing goals of Member States to lower interest rates, inflation benefits, employment, growth 
etc.    
 
The second part of our analysis will focus and elaborate on the Danish possible political and 
economic consequences of the Fiscal Compact and the fiscal spillover. Its primary aim is to address 
research question three. From a political perspective Denmark is not part of the central decision 
making bodies in economic and financial realms. For example, Denmark is not represented in the 
Eurogroup which means less influence in economic and political areas that may have an effect on the 
Danish economic policy options such as: sound budget management, cutting of expenditure and 
reforms of competitiveness. Moreover, Denmark is not represented in the Governing Council of the 
ECB who determines the monetary policy (interest rates, exchange rate) and economic related 
decisions that have an effect on the Danish ERM II agreement. The question here is whether the 
implications of the spillover effects on a European level, and the consequential economic and 
political options on the Danish domestic level, have a real influence on the Danish political economy.  
 
2.0 Analytical Framework 
2.1 Neo-functionalism 
Through our analysis we seek to uncover whether there has occurred a fiscal spillover, and in such a 
scenario whether the spillover has occurred in the case of Denmark. As previously discussed, the 
exchange rate mechanism ties Denmark closely with the Euro. Therefore we seek to investigate how 
the current Euro crisis influences fixed exchange rate partners like Denmark. Changing market 
dynamics have affected the EMU structure considerably since 2007, and therefore it is relevant to 
investigate how this affects Denmark, given that they are highly susceptible toward changing 
dynamics within the EMU construction and also changing market behavior, as illustrated earlier. A 
critical point to our argument is that due to the nature of a fixed exchange rate mechanism and 
changing market dynamics Denmark is compelled to align itself closely with Eurozone Member 
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States in order to deter speculation against the DKK. As the Eurozone Member States have struggled 
to come to terms with the current crisis, a centralization of fiscal policies has emerged, whereby 
more powers are transferred to Brussels, we therefore want to investigate whether an occurrence of a 
fiscal spillover is present.  
 
The notion of spillover is both present in European integration theories but it is also a concept within 
OCA theory. This project tries to combine both the economic theory and the political theory to 
explain the complex dynamics, which are involved in accessing how the Euro crisis affected 
Denmark. The concept of spillover in European studies can be traced back to the works of Ernst Hass 
and Leon Lindberg, but our analysis will focus on the revised neo-functionalist works of Arne 
Niemann (2006) and Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991) who sought to further develop the concept 
of spillovers. Neo-functionalism as a theory has been highly contested, but as Mikkelsen (1991) 
highlights “that ‘new dynamism’ of the Commission since 1985 reveals important elements of the 
neo-functionalist logic and argues that this should lead to renewed research along neo-functionalist 
lines” (Mikkelsen; 1991: 2). This project will primarily concern itself with the concept of spillover 
and not as neo-functionalism as such, thus we will give an overview of the complexities in the 
spillover concept.  
 
A fiscal spillover, broadly defined, refers to an integration process in which fiscal policies are 
centralized at the European level, due to various pressures. The process in which this occurs can be 
understood by understanding the functional, political and cultivated spillovers, who are subject to a 
number of countervailing forces. Central to spillovers is the perception that integration within one 
sector will spread to other sectors, due to the functioning of supranational institutions. The reason 
being, that the European economies are interdependent of each other, and hence the “functional 
integration of one task inevitably leads to problems which can only be solved by integrating yet more 
tasks” (Niemann; 2006: 17 & Mikkelsen; 1991: 4). The entire process is supported by economic and 
political elites, who have realized that their objectives are achieved better at the supranational level 
and therefore add political incentive, pressuring for further integration (Niemann; 2006: 16-17).  
 
Once decision-making abilities were shifted to the European institutions they became agents of 
additional integration. Instead of abiding to domestic interests of the Member States, central 
authorities within Brussels would become a mediatory instrument between Member States, seeking 
to advance common interests or “splitting the difference” (Niemann; 2006: 19 & Mikkelsen; 1991: 
6). 
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The integration process is caused by pressures, both spillover pressures and endogenous or what 
Niemann refers to as ‘pressures from within’ (Niemann; 2006: 30-31). Spillover pressures especially 
stem from exogenous pressures i.e. external pressures or economic shocks, which can induce closer 
integration between European countries. According to Niemann (2006), exogenous pressures and 
factors have an impact on actors preferences and “also influence EU and domestic structures” (ibid.,  
32). Niemann does recognize the possibility of spillback, arguing that pressures can create negative 
integration. However, it usually creates a positive integration process (ibid., 33). Niemann highlights 
how the inclusion of exogenous spillover that affects the EU “need to be viewed in the global 
context” (ibid., 32). This particular point of view is in particular relevant for us, since we argue that 
the global financial crisis were a contributing factor to the Euro crisis. However, exogenous 
pressures alone do not determine actor’s behavior, but can influence endogenous pressures. In our 
case the financial crisis is considered to constitute the exogenous pressure, but it is was not enough to 
induce an integration process, but the severity of the economic shock did influence various actors 
across the Member States who began to exert pressures towards deeper fiscal coordination at a 
European level. Market behavior during the crisis, revealed a need for actors to react if they wanted 
to prevent a Greek bankruptcy. Correspondingly, contagion effects on the government bonds market 
threatened the Euro existence. The combination of an external economic shock and market behavior 
is considered to be external factors to the Euro crisis, but which exerts considerable pressure on 
actors/agents to act. 
 
Endogenous pressures are exerted by actors/agents, or what Niemann refers to as ‘pressures within’ 
(ibid., 31). If an exogenous pressure is compelling enough actors might seek to further expand co-
operation or what original neo-functionalists referred to as task-expansions. According to Niemann, 
actors/agents create spillovers, and spillovers are a result of conscious choice, considering that 
actors/agents “base their behavior on consequential calculations of self-interest and try and enhance 
their utility through strategic exchanges” (ibid., 25). This essentially means that endogenous pressure 
are created by actors deliberate choices, which means that actors are the main agents of integration 
through the exertion of pressure. Structures/institutions are the product of actors creation and 
actors/agents can change these institutions according to their self-interest. However Niemann, 
highlights that once structures are created actors will tend to do this through the existing structures. 
The reason being that actors’/agents preferences can change over time through interaction. This 
interaction may eventually “alter actors preferences” into what he refers to as “community/ 
collaborative norms” (ibid., 41). The internalization of community/collaborative norms is a gradual 
process, however once internalized “agents are likely to uncover structural factors, which are 
subsequently incorporated in their deliberations” (ibid., 41). In this project actors and agents are 
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identified as carriers of spillovers, which mean that individual actors and decision-making bodies and 
entities all surmount to being actors/agents. This project especially focuses on, how domestic 
political interest of France and Germany, not only pushed for the creation of the Euro but also have 
been carriers of institutional development in the wake of the Euro crisis. Moreover, this project also 
highlights the increasing role of informal bodies like the Eurogroup as carriers of spillovers. Formal 
bodies like the Governing Council of the ECB and the Commission need also to be highlighted, as 
they have been given a mandate by Member States, which give them decision-making competences.  
 
Both Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991) and Niemann (2006) focus their discussion of spillover toward 
three varieties of spillover; functional, political and cultivated spillovers. In their usage of the 
theoretical terms they argue that the spillover goes hand in hand if the they are to result in an 
expansion of the breadth and depth of European integration.  
 
2.1.(1) Functional spillover 
Functional spillover is in reality the occurrence of a technical spillover, which is caused by the need 
to accomplish a functional task. In order to accomplish a task further integration is needed in other 
sectors, the reason being that European economies are very interdependent and therefore integrations 
within one sector will inevitably affect other related sectors. Functional spillover stresses how 
economic interdependence between Member States affects policy creation at a European level. In 
this context, a functional spillover will entail the removal of barriers for the accomplishment of 
functional task (ibid., 30-34).  
 
One focal concern within the project is how fiscal barriers have been removed as a response to the 
ongoing Euro crisis. Fiscal barriers relates to how countries have the ability to make their own fiscal 
policy according to their own economic needs, for instance a country wants to pursue an expansive 
or tight fiscal policy depending on their cyclical fluctuations. As a consequence of the Euro crisis and 
the Fiscal Compact, fiscal barriers have been removed from a number of countries. In agreeing to the 
Fiscal Compact countries have agreed to adjust their fiscal policies according to a strict set of 
conditions, which will be monitored by a number of European institutions. Certain fiscal 
competences are therefore surrendered since a participating Member State can no longer 
independently make fiscal policies. According our definition, a fiscal policy is decided upon by the 
government; who choose how the state’s money should be spent (public spending) combined with 
deciding on the state’s revenues (taxes). In relation to the integration processes and pressures, 
functional spillovers are in this context referred to those processes, which expand the breadth of the 
European institutions. This is due to the fact, that there also occurs a transfer of technical supervisor 
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competences, which have traditionally belonged to the Member State, which now are transferred to 
European institutions, implying a loss of barriers from the national level. This transfer thus entails 
specific functional spillover, as national barriers are removed and supranational competences are 
increased at the expense of the individual Member State. 
2.1.(2) Political spillover 
Political spillover is the process in which actors shift their allegiance from the domestic level to the 
European level in their attempt to achieve specific goals. Essentially, it is process whereby political 
loyalties are transferred to the European level in the assumption that their goals are better achieved at 
the European level as opposed to the domestic level. As a result these actors start to pressure for 
further integration, which leads to a buildup of pressures within. Exogenous pressure and domestic 
constraints, the constraints and pressures of globalization influence actor’s behaviors and opinions, 
which in turn become carriers of functional spillover. In addition, Niemann highlights that the 
duration and level of interaction with the European level is likely to contribute to a increased 
likelihood of the European institutions to be considered better channels for achieving actors 
objectives. Niemann calls this process social spillover but the differentiation between political and 
social spillover is less relevant for the purposes of this project (ibid., 34-42).  
 
An example of political spillover in our project is how austerity measures increasingly emerge as the 
method and a potential solution to the crisis and becomes an integrated part of the Fiscal Compact. 
Moreover, how Denmark are politically incentivized to align themselves with Eurozone Member 
States by signing the Fiscal Compact as a progressive display to show credibility (method to prevent 
an exchange rate crisis).  
 
2.1.(3) Cultivated spillover 
Cultivated spillover demonstrates that once competences are transferred to European institutions 
these institutions are likely to induce further integration processes, which are unforeseen by the 
actors who originally transferred competences to those institutions. Therefore, cultivated spillovers 
are consequences of spillover pressure and pressures within. Cultivated spillovers are normally 
unforeseen since decision-making at the intergovernmental level is often results of imperfect 
knowledge and thus unforeseen results. Once established European institutions evolve independently 
of the actors who created them. As such, institutions become carriers of further integration, since 
they seek to increase their influence. Given that institutions are supranational in their day-to-day 
running they are no longer deeply dependant on national interests and seek European compromises 
rather than national interest. This essentially means that European institutions affirm and induce 
commonalities between Member States, causing negotiations processes between Member States 
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when new goals have to be set. This negotiation process requires a compromise of national interests 
and the transfer of additional competences from the national to the European level, meaning the 
removal of national barriers to secure European objectives (ibid., 42-47). 
 
In relation to our project, the Fiscal Compact is a specific example how competences are added to 
European institutions. These competences enable European institutions to evaluate and determine 
whether national fiscal policies are in line with European objectives. Thus there occurs a cultivated 
spillover in fiscal management, since the supervision of fiscal policies are interpreted by European 
bodies and not national governments, who in return have to implement recommendations of 
European institutions 
2.1.(4) Countervailing forces 
Niemann argues that the integration process is subject to a series of countervailing forces, which 
affect the breadth and depth of the spillover by either stagnating the process or results in a spillback 
of the process.  Niemann identifies four primary countervailing forces, which can exist singularly or 
in combination of two or more. Member States might be reluctant to transfer national competences to 
the European level this is referred to as sovereignty-consciousness. In addition, domestic constraints 
can be disruptive for the integration process. Constraints can be of a structural character in which 
legislation and constitutional practices prohibits the transfer of specific competences, but can also be 
domestic pressures both electoral and political which perimeter the government’s autonomy. 
Moreover, structural, historical and political diversities between various Member States can be 
disintegrative since “common positions or policies may require some Member States to diverge 
substantially from existing structures, customs and policies”, thus increasing the cost of integration 
significantly (ibid., 49). Lastly, a general disintegrative climate will be countervailing for the 
effectiveness of spillovers. Meaning, attitudes across the Member States will impact especially the 
likelihood of fiscal spillovers. In this situation, a Member States commitment to specific European 
treaties may be superficies and never fully implemented across the European countries due to a 
disintegrative climate (ibid., 47-50).    
 
The overall importance of countervailing forces has something to do with how spillovers expand the 
breadth and depths of the integration processes. Thus, there can exist spillovers, which have little real 
value to them if the countervailing forces are too great. Moreover, intergovernmental agreements can 
still be an expansion if the countervailing forces are minimum. In order to understand the 
consequences of the spillovers, you need to take into consideration the level and degree of 
countervailing forces. 
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2.1.(5) Using neo-functionalism in the analysis 
Our analysis will incorporate neo-functionalism as a tool to establish and evaluate how Denmark is 
affected by the current crisis and how a fiscal spillover occurs in Denmark as a result. But the 
dynamics involved in these processes are quite diverse yet interlinked. Such affects on Denmark 
cannot be viewed singularly without an overall understanding of the Euro crisis dimension. Our 
analysis will therefore consider both to establish spillovers, which have European as well as the 
Danish implications. 
 
In order to do so, our analysis will be focused toward indentifying and discussing various forms of 
pressures. Within this perspective, special attention will be on those exogenous factors, which 
created pressures within Denmark but also at the European level, since these are viewed as an 
extension of each other, and hence cannot be viewed separately. Secondly, we will identify 
functional, political and cultivated spillover, by deepening the discussion already presented above. 
This will also further elaborate how spillovers can be further understood and interpreted. Functional 
spillover will focus primarily on what types of barriers are removed at the domestic level and what 
technical competence loss there occurs. The reason for this clarification is that functional and 
cultivated spillovers can be similar, in so far as, they both look at transfers of competences from the 
national to the European level. However, functional spillovers will be more concentrated towards the 
national loss of competences. In our analysis, political spillovers look at the political pressures within 
and especially how political concepts like austerity, become an integral part of how European 
solutions are developed and affect policy-making at the European level, but also at the national level. 
Cultivated spillovers will discuss how competences are added to the European institutions and how 
their role is changed or different as a consequence.  
 
However, the analysis is not complete without indentifying some of the countervailing forces since 
they influence the consequence of the spillover. Thus we discuss some of the countervailing forces, 
emphasizing especially countervailing forces at the Danish domestic level, since implementation of 
the Fiscal Compact is a national matter. But countervailing forces will also consider countervailing 
forces at the European level since cultivated spillovers might prove to be an illusion, rather than real, 
if the climate is sufficiently disintegrative or too diverse. For this reason, we will also make some 
overall evaluations on how to understand spillovers and countervailing forces, in order to evaluate 
how Denmark is affected by the Euro crisis.   
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2.2 Optimum Currency Area 
The aim of this section is to give an overview of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory. In this 
project OCA theory is used primarily to gain an understanding of the various economic dynamics 
and should be seen, as being complementary to the theory neo-functionalism. OCA is a theory that 
concerns itself with the establishment of a single currency, and was primarily developed by Robert 
Mundell in 1961. This section will give a short overview of core arguments of the theory, but 
exchange rate dimensions, intended to contextualize Denmark fixed exchange against the Euro 
within OCA will be elaborated upon in later in the analytical framework (see section 3.3 on exchange 
rate systems). 
 
Mundell (in Artis & Nixson) argues that a monetary union essentially entails delegating sovereignty 
in monetary policy, in favor of a single currency adopted across a wider region (Hovell in Artis & 
Nixson; 2007: 245). The theory highlights some of the costs and benefits associated with the 
establishment of a monetary union. In a monetary union the participating countries give up their 
national currency and monetary policy. Instead they gain from the elimination of foreign exchange 
transactions costs associated in trade. Moreover, a monetary union enables greater price transparency 
when all goods are priced in Euros, which could lead to increased competition in the Single Market, 
in the case of EU. The argument is based on the idea that price transparency may lead to increased 
competition because the currency uncertainty is removed.  This means that it is easier for consumers 
to buy cheaper goods on the single market, which should result in an increase in competition 
(European Central Bank, Benefits of the Euro; 2013). Furthermore, creating a single market within a 
Monetary Union increases the competition between firms. This is done by enabling the freedoms of 
movement in capital, labor, services and goods. Additionally, the benefit of the single market 
involves the removal of tax barriers, trade borders and improvement of technical standards. Thus, 
these affects may altogether lead to lower prices for consumers because price transparency results in 
increased competition.    
 
Mundell highlighted how a monetary union would also lead to an integrated market-based European 
financial-market as a result of the elimination of currency risk, and therefore a more efficient 
European finance. The creation of a single currency (Euro) increases the credibility of the currency 
on the international market. Moreover, adopting a common currency means that you remove the 
option of currency speculation that leads to more stability of capital flows and less financial pressure. 
If the ECB keeps inflation in check, a country would be joining a low inflation area, which 
contributes to economic efficiency and credibility of the central bank. ECB tasks of ensuring 
financial stability by keeping inflation below 2 % should lead to lower interest rates and regulate the 
price and wage-setting. This should have a positive influence on economic growth and create less 
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incentive for financial markets to speculate on currency appreciations (ibid.) The aforementioned can 
be summarized into four key points, namely; 
 
1. Elimination of foreign exchange transactions costs with other Euro zone countries. 
2. Greater price transparency when all goods are priced in Euros may lead to increased 
competition in the Single Market.    
3. Participation in integrated market-based European financial markets as the result of the 
elimination of currency risk. Leads to more efficient European finance. 
4.  If the ECB keeps inflation in check, a country would be joining a low inflation area, 
which contributes to economic efficiency and credibility of the Central Bank. 
 
From these four listed advantages, it is clear that the arguments for adopting a single currency in an 
optimal currency area are related to the economic and political benefits. The aim of supporting 
important macroeconomic outcomes such as growth, employment and price inflation is done by the 
integration of economic policies. From this perspective then, the integration of economic policies in 
the EMU can be explained as a way of securing macroeconomic stability centered on the Euro single 
currency. Convergence in economic areas, such as fixing exchange-rate to a common currency, 
inflation target by an independent central bank, fiscal requirements etc., are therefore tools to this 
end. Moreover, the size of the economy in a monetary union also helps small economies from 
external economic shocks, such as for example unexpected oil price increases, turbulence in currency 
markets etc. 
2.2.(1) Prerequisite for a monetary union 
OCA explains that four criteria have to be evaluated if the benefits are to outweigh the costs of 
monetary union. According to Jay H. Lenin, this depends on an evaluation of four factors: first, the 
amount of trade integration with the other countries in the Eurozone; the amount of labor mobility 
within the monetary union; the amount of "asymmetric shocks" that hit the country; and the 
flexibility of wages within the country (O’Beirne, Systems modeling; 2013). Although there is no 
clear empirical evidence to substantiate whether it is advantageous or more costly to join a MU to 
this date a good point of departure is to understand the theoretical reasons for setting up a MU was 
formulated by Robert Mundell in his OCA theory (ibid.).   
  
2.2.(2) Costs of monetary union 
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OCA does also identify a series of associated costs of a monetary union. The costs of joining a 
monetary union implies that you have less tools to mitigate factors of asymmetrical shocks 
(including monetary policy), which means that fiscal coordination and labour mobility become 
important (Krugman 2012: 9). Secondly, a country may have to substantially limit its use of 
expansionary fiscal policy under the Stability and Growth Pact. Among other fiscal requirements in 
the SGP, the public deficit (max 3 %) and budget debt (max 60 %) means that the respective country 
cannot use an expansionary fiscal policy to stimulate the economy (for example in recessions), 
because then they would exceed these requirements. The euro crisis revealed shortages for the 
traditional OCA theory for two reasons: Firstly, one of the problems that the euro crisis showed was 
that adopting of the euro as a common currency did not lead to financial stability. The asymmetrical 
shocks increased the fiscal burdens of deficit countries to the extent that it put government solvency 
into question, a development which economists had not anticipated. Secondly, the OCA theory did 
not take into account the importance of having a central bank system as opposed to a regional bank 
system, where bailouts could be guaranteed on a State level like in the US where the federal state 
ensures bailouts for Governments. In contrast to this, European States have struggled on bailout 
related decision-making, reflecting jumps in Government debt in deficit countries and divergent 
interest rates. (ibid., 9) 
 
In order to overcome some the associated costs, Mundell (in Artis & Nixson) has argued that flexible 
labor mobility or wage flexibility was essential to prevent regional imbalances since countries cannot 
adjust their monetary policy to demand shocks (Hovell in Artis & Nixson; 2007: 247 & Grauwe; 
2009: 9). Thus Mundell argued, that similar business cycles were essential, the reason being that the 
interest rate is the same for all countries. This means that ECB cannot adjust the common interest 
rate to fit the needs simultaneously if asymmetrical shocks occur. In a possible scenario of a demand 
shock that hits differently, Germany will for example experience an increase in demand while France 
experiences a decrease in demand. Germany will in this theoretical case benefit from an increase in 
interest rate to equilibrate the excesses in demand, while France would benefit from a decrease in 
interest rates to restore a situation of full employment (Hovell in Artis & Nixson; 2007: 247).  
 
According to the optimum currency theory monetary unions are required to have similar business 
cycles and coordinate their fiscal policies since a “centralized budget will work as a shock absorber” 
(Grauwe; 2009: 222).  The reason being that during a centralized fiscal policy, imbalances will be 
adjusted through redistribution of money, thus softening the economic shocks (ibid., 222-223). 
However, if budgets are not centralized, as is the case with the Euro, imbalances between the 
countries are not redistributed. In this case, if one country is hit by a demand shock (decrease in 
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demand) a budget deficit may happen as a result because the government expenses increase as firms 
will have to sack employees and tax income decreases as a result. Thus the country will be forced to 
borrow abroad to finance its deficits or alter its fiscal policy to ensure investors that debt will be 
repaid. Since monetary policy cannot be used to stabilize the economy in a monetary union when 
asymmetrical demand shocks occur, an argument is that the fiscal policy should be used actively. 
However, the independence of fiscal policy is contested because firstly, it may be necessary to 
coordinate the fiscal policy to make the monetary union stable with the rest of the world and, 
secondly, the fiscal policy is constrained because the budget deficit of each country has to be 
financed either by government burrowing (selling public sector debt) or increasing the money supply 
(which is not possible in a monetary union). Additionally, selling public sector debt is restrained by 
the fact that the interest rate is determined by the central bank that may have other concerns in mind 
(see Euro crisis section) (Hovell in Artis & Nixson; 2007: 247). 
 
According to the optimum currency theory such scenarios would be eliminated in a fiscal union, 
since social costs for individual countries would be reduced (Grauwe; 2009: 223-224). Thus, 
permanent budget deficits cannot exist. The reason being, that if a country runs budget deficits for 
two years it has to have equal surpluses for two years. Moreover, “if the interest rate on the 
government debt exceeds the growth rate of the economy, a debt dynamic is set in motion which 
leads to an ever-increasing government debt relative to GDP” (ibid., 226). This problem could be 
solved by seigniorage, which is revenues from money creation but this cannot happen in a monetary 
union or without changing the currency board. 
 
Moreover, if capital markets in the monetary union works sufficiently the debt problem will be 
considered to be an individual country’s problem and not a problem of the entire monetary union. 
Thus the debt for country that is experiencing deficits will thus experience a risk premium 
attachment, while other countries will not. Hence, the interest rate attached to one country might be 
higher or lower from another depending on the budget deficits or surpluses. Financing accumulation 
of debt in a monetary union will then vary between countries resulting in real divergent economic 
situations reflected in the fiscal policies (ibid., 233). The only way to operate the fiscal policy (and 
keep investors’ expectations of returns on loans high) is to adopt tight fiscal budgetary restrictions by 
reducing spending and/or increasing taxes. Therefore, OCA theory argues that fiscal policies “should 
be used in a flexible way” in a monetary union (ibid., 224).   
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2.2.(3) Fiscal spillover’s  
When shocks occur in these systems this will automatically create a negative fiscal spill-over if 
markets are highly integrated as in a monetary union or Denmark with the Eurozone countries (ibid., 
232). If a country is running budget deficits over a long period and speculation increases regarding 
whether this country might default on their foreign debt, it will have a negative effect on other 
countries in the monetary union due to their close level of proximity. Speculation can arise when 
neighboring countries face an economic crisis because the credibility of their exchange rate is called 
into question, the proximity might create questions regarding your exchange rate. Thus, revealing 
that in a monetary union the interconnectedness of fiscal discipline and debt accumulation matters. 
According to the theory there are two solutions in this case, either leave the fixed exchange rate 
system and move into a flexible exchange rate system or join a monetary union, whereby abolishing 
your exchange rate (ibid., 124). These are however to be considered two extreme solutions.   
 
Consequently, other countries might face similar speculation and be inclined to defend the currency 
against shocks by pushing for increased interest rates at the central bank. Given that they have 
surrendered levels of their adjustment mechanisms, they might be disposed to coordinate their fiscal 
policies as a response to the shock/speculation. Furthermore, the prospect of one potential defaulting 
member might create questions regarding the sustainability of other countries and increase the 
burden of those countries. This is also called the contagion effect. This can similarly also happen in a 
pegged system as mentioned earlier where especially interest rates in pegged countries are highly 
susceptible to changes in interest rates in the anchor country, which will imply fiscal adjustments 
(ibid., 130-133, 233). 
 
If a country or several countries are in a situation where debt is accumulated continuously, the 
respective country will have to lend from capital markets of the union, which may cause an increase 
in interest rates in the union as a result. This pushes other countries to tighten their fiscal policy 
resulting in deflation. Moreover, in such a situation of divergent economies, the ECB’s interest rate 
instrument might be compromised as a common target. This happens if deflating countries (with 
sound budgets) persuade ECB to lower interest rates leading to financial instability (ibid., 323).  
 
2.2.(4) Using OCA as an analytical tool 
Using OCA theory enables us to gain an understanding of EMU from a theoretical standpoint. The 
evolution and setup of the EMU is inspired by OCA theory (Furrutter; 2012: 3). Thus, by gaining an 
understanding of OCA, one could also anticipate to gain an understanding of how OCA explains 
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some of the structural imbalances, which were the causal factors to the current Euro crisis. The OCA 
theory is the basis for understanding some of the institutional developments, which came out of the 
establishment of the EMU. OCA theory is thus actively used throughout both the analytical 
framework and analysis to gain a greater understanding of how OCA was understood by the EMU 
creators and financial markets. Secondly, OCA theory also allows us to understand the causal 
relationship that exists between the Euro and the DKK. The understanding of the currency boards 
enables us to access how political and economic developments within Eurozone have affected 
Denmark, because OCA theory establishes a causal relationship between anchor and pegged 
countries. This relationship will, as mentioned before, be examined in more detail in section 3.3.1. In 
addition, our assessment of the economic impact on Denmark in our analysis is motivated by our 
understanding of OCA theory.  OCA is critical to understanding some of the key areas in our 
analysis such as; the relevance of maintaining a narrow yield spread and accessing the credibility of 
economic “figures” (currency pressure financial markets), the complex relationship between the ECB 
and Danish Central Bank, implementation and compliance of the Fiscal Compact, understanding the 
limitations on fiscal policy and austerity measures. 
 
2.2.(5) Using optimum currency area theory and neo-functionalism as an analytical tool 
At this point it is necessary to discuss how the neo-functionalism and optimum currency area theory 
have actively been used to establish the analytical framework and how they will be used in the 
analysis. Optimum currency area theory is an integrative part of the analytical framework used to 
discuss many of the economic aspects of our enquiry. Neo-functionalism identifies the integration 
processes involved in the recent institutional developments in the wake of the Euro crisis and also 
shed light on how European fiscal policies can be understood and interpreted in the future. It 
however doesn’t explain the underlying reasons of why deeper fiscal coordination was deemed 
necessary at the European level to stabilize and save the Euro, and why markets responded 
negatively on fiscal imbalances. However, the theory of optimum currency area does shed light on, 
not only, the economic ideas behind the Euro, but also why fiscal constraints and fiscal centralization 
was considered a solution to the Euro crisis. Moreover, the focus toward fiscal policies and fiscal 
imbalances has also influenced market behavior during the Euro crisis. Thus, the importance of using 
optimum currency area theory is a central component to understanding some of the very interesting 
political and economic dynamics in these processes. Alone, OCA doesn’t contribute to any greater 
understanding of the political processes occurring during a fiscal spillover, since fiscal spillover is 
considered as somewhat automatic response to economic shocks.  
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A fiscal spillover according to OCA occurs if a country is running deficits over a long period and 
question arises whether this country might have to default on their foreign debt. This will increase 
speculation and due to their level of proximity other countries might face similar speculation and 
thus be inclined to defend their currency against shocks. Given that they have surrendered two or 
three levels of their adjustment mechanisms they might be disposed to coordinate their fiscal policies 
as a response to the shock/speculation. Furthermore, the prospect of one potential defaulting member 
might create questions regarding the sustainability of other countries and increase the burden of those 
countries. This is also called the contagion effect. As such OCA sees fiscal spillover as a somewhat 
automatic response to economic shocks, if countries are highly economically interdependent.  
 
Moreover, fiscal spillover is considered by OCA to end in fiscal union. However, this is not what 
happened in the case of the Euro, and therefore can be a product of other processes. Neo-
functionalism on the other hand has a very different understanding of fiscal spillover. In this case, 
fiscal spillover is the consequence of a combination of functional, political and cultivated spillovers 
which occurs as a result of spillover pressures and pressures within which can expand the breadth 
and depth of EU institutions, culminating in deeper integration at the European level. However the 
integration process is also subject to a number of countervailing forces. Thus, the neo-functionalist 
spillover provides a more dynamic understanding of how actors/agents are carriers of spillovers. 
Combining both OCA theory and neo-functionalism highlights the underlying reasons why fiscal 
spillover pressures occur and how political actors become carriers of further integration, which 
extends the breadth and depth of the European Union. Using the theories as such enables us to 
maintain the earlier definition of fiscal spillover, at which point a fiscal spillover is a process of fiscal 
centralization, which subject to economic and political developments and understanding, shapes the 
form and shape of the centralization. The form and shape can thus best be understood by 
understanding both the economic and political processes.   
2.3 The implementation of OCA within the EMU 
Previously, we assessed the main arguments of the OCA theory. In this respect we found that the 
OCA theory prescribed the coordination of monetary, economic and fiscal policies as essential for 
establishing a monetary union with macroeconomic stability. One of the central costs was giving up 
monetary policy, whereas the central benefits included the promotion of trade and investments by 
eliminating exchange rate fluctuations and currency uncertainty (Hovell in Artis & Nixson 2007: 
245). The purpose is to define what economic policies the EMU is constructed on and examine how 
the OCA theory arguments were integrated within the EMU framework. Emphasis will be put on 
how competences and mechanisms were distributed between Member States and European 
Institutions. The sections are structured around the central OCA arguments above starting with a 
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short historical contextualization of the EMU and secondly, how competences were divided 
throughout the main institutions of the EMU. Thus, we will look at especially the ECB, Growth and 
Stability Pact (GSP). 
 
The setup of the EMU was especially reflective of some the dynamics during the early 1990’s, 
particularly French and German pressures. France had showed considerable interest towards an 
economic union, in the hope to increase the value of the French currency. Germany had however 
remained reluctant to this process, because it lacked practical advantages to its industrial economy, 
this position changed with the unification of Germany. Thus, the Monetary Union became a product 
of the French inspirational design, and the German technical and institutional expertise (Dyson & 
Featherstone; 1999: 240-247 & Beck; 2013: 27-28). It is important for the reader to keep in mind, 
that “France and also Italy wanted the Euro for sovereignty reasons, but Germany agreed to move in 
that direction only under the condition that EMU would be run in a German-style fashion” (Jabko; 
2010: 325). Thus, economic convergence remained forefront of EMU. A main prerequisite of EMU 
was established through various convergence criteria. These were considered important for economic 
stability when the EMU was established as the coordination of the economies to ensure similar 
business cycles and symmetrical economic principles. A central building block for the establishment 
of the EMU was the Maastricht treaty in 1991 in which an EMU timetable was constructed around 
five convergence criteria and three stages of economic integration (Hovell in Artis & Nixson; 2007: 
253-254).  The transition would be gradual and extending over several years; and entry into the union 
was conditional on the convergence criteria.  
 
The EMU was introduced in three stages: First, the on-going stage (1990-1993), the objective was to 
fully integrate the markets into one by removing internal barriers to the free movement of goods, 
persons, capital and services; stage two (1994-1998), entailed the technical preparations for a single 
currency and convergence of economic and monetary policies of member states; finally the third 
(1999-2002), the introduction of the single currency, the Euro, and the transfer of monetary policy 
competences to the European Central Bank (ECB; 2009: 5). The convergence criteria were set to 
ensure that countries would lead sound economic policies oriented towards stability as well as being 
able to maintain price stability in order to create alignment between the member states (ECB; 2012a: 
263).  
 
Its design centered around five convergence targets, once achieved countries were considered highly 
integrative according to the OCA theory. Its inflation rate could not exceed 1.5% higher than the 
average of the three lowest inflation rates among the EU member states. Secondly, its long term 
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interest rate is not more than 2% higher than the average observed in these three low-interest rate 
countries. Thirdly, those countries who had joined the exchange rate mechanism (ERM, ERMII) of 
the European Monetary System (EMS) and who had not experienced a devaluation during the two 
years preceding joining the union were considered integrated and successfully kept its monetary 
exchange rate within a +/- 15% range from an unchanged central rate. Lastly, countries had to keep 
their government budget deficit at a maximum 3% of its GDP. Many of the convergence criteria 
reflect the German prerogative of price stability and lower inflation (Beck; 2013: 21-28) need 
references.  
 
So why is inflation and price stability relevant? From an intermediate perspective, price stability is 
defined by the ECB as ‘’A year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP) for the Euro area of below 2%’’ (ECB, The definition of price stability; 2013). In other 
words, a situation in which prices in an economy does not change much over time. The objective of 
price stability refers to the general level of prices in the economy. It implies avoiding both prolonged 
inflation and deflation. If prices are stable, firms and consumers do not run the risk of misinterpreting 
changes in the general price level as relative prices change and can make better informed 
consumption and investment decisions. In addition uncertainty, about the rate of inflation may also 
lead firms to make wrong employment decisions by deciding to invest less or lay off workers in 
order to reduce its production capacities (Gerdesmeier, 2007: 29). Price stability reduces uncertainty 
of inflation and therefore helps to prevent the misallocation of resources. It can be argued that 
“consistent” price stability increases the efficiency of the economy, by helping the market guide 
resources to where they can be utilized most productively.  
Furthermore, price stability contributes to the planning of achieving high levels of economic activity 
and employment by improving the transparency of the price mechanism. Under price stability people 
can recognize changes in relative prices (i.e. prices between different goods), without being confused 
by changes in the overall price level. This allows them to make well-informed consumption and 
investment decisions and to allocate resources more efficiently. Secondly, there occurs a reduction 
inflation risks. This reduces real interest rates and increases incentives to invest. However, it can be 
argued that it is not common for an economy to ever experience price stability in its “pure” form as 
the definition implies. (ibid., 30) 
2.4 Implementation of objectives within the European institutions 
The objectives mentioned above were institutionalized by the ECB, with the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) providing an overall framework for ensuring that the rules are upheld. Thus it is relevant 
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to give an overview of ECB and SGP, as tools for understanding the structural and institutional 
imbalances in the EMU, which have played a significant role in the wake of the Euro crisis. 
2.4.(1) The Stability and Growth Pact 
SGP has a twofold role, a preventive and a corrective role. According to preventive arm of the SGP
2
, 
Member States are required to maintain budgetary discipline in relation to public finance and 
government budgets. In the Maastricht Treaty it was declared that: “Member states shall avoid 
excessive government deficits” (TFEU, Art. 126(1)). It is considered an early warning system, with 
the goal of preventing excessive budget deficits within the Member States. The main features 
consisted of stability programs that monitor the compliance of maintaining budgets. Member States 
were obliged to submit annual reports to the Commission and the Council with key economic data, 
showing how they intended to safeguard sound fiscal positions. These included information on 
Member States’ government budgets for the years ahead, the forecast of economic development as 
well as details of economic policy the Member States intended to implement in order to meet the 
targets set out by the SGP. The corrective role
3
 comes into force when Member States are in breach 
of the preventive arm. It defines the reference values of a 3% public deficit and a 60% of debt-to-
GDP ratio. As a step-by-step procedure for correcting excessive deficits that occur when one or both 
of the rules are breached i.e. exceeding a 3% public deficit and a 60% debt-to-GDP ratio.  A failure 
to comply with either the preventive or corrective arms of the SGP can lead to the imposition of 
sanctions for Euro area countries. In the case of the corrective arm, this can involve annual fines 
0.5% of GDP
4
 for Euro area Member States until the excessive deficit is restored. 
 
However in practice, the implementation of the SPG showed relatively early that it was unable to 
maintain its role as a preventive and corrective arm. Already in the early years of the Euro, Germany 
and France failed to comply with the 3 percent government budget deficit limit. The Commission 
began proceedings against both Germany and France, however a ruling from ECJ established that the 
corrective arm remained primarily within the discretionary responsibility of the Council (Jabko; 
2010: 327). Furthermore, the SPG was reformed as to “allow for cyclical deficits, even though the 
obligation of fiscal discipline remained the cornerstone of the Pact” (ibid., 327). Thus, the objective 
of fiscal discipline was largely ignored by leading Eurozone Member States and “the Maastrict 
framework did not contain strong incentives for Member States to exercise peer pressure and to 
effectively enforce the SGP” (Yiangou et al; 2013: 228).       
 
                                                 
2 See TFEU Article 121 
3 See TFEU Article 126 
4 The fine has increased to 1% of GDP with the launch of the Fiscal Compact. See Treaty on the Stability, 
Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG)   
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2.4.(2) The European Central Bank  
On the other hand, the ECB main role was not in regard to fiscal imbalances, but rather the 
consolidation and maintenance of the control of the inflation and price stability
5
. This was considered 
a prerequisite for EMU. Its final construction derived through the Delors Report in 1988, the Treaty 
of Maastricht in 1992 and Stability and Growth Pact (Naudin; 2000: 93-97, Molle; 2006: 124-129). 
From an immediate point of view, the ECB is the central bank, as the name implies, for the Euro and 
administers the monetary policy of the 17 EU Member States and is located in Frankfurt, Germany. 
The owners and shareholders of the ECB are the central banks of the 27 Member States of the EU. 
Some of its basic tasks consist of defining and implementing the monetary policy for the Eurozone. 
Additionally, the ECB reserves the executive right to issue Euro banknotes and coins, considered one 
of the largest currency areas in the world. The main limitation of using the monetary policy to ensure 
price stability is that ECB focuses its monetary policy on controlling price inflation, rather than 
stabilizing the business cycles of EMU. Thus, the ECB may take on a more cautious approach 
compared to for example the US Federal Reserve Bank as it is limited by the main objectives 
described in the EU framework (treaty). According to Yiangou, the ECB’s main objective was to 
“ensure monetary dominance”, which meant that ECB was prohibited in “financing public deficits” 
(Yiangou et al; 2013: 226). Moreover, interest rates cannot stabilize the economies in a monetary 
union if demand shocks affect the economies differently. To specify the price stability objective, the 
Governing Council of the ECB announced the following quantitative definition ‘’Price stability shall 
be defined as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the 
Euro area of below but close to 2%. Price stability is to be maintained over the medium term’’ (ECB, 
The definition of price stability; 2013). This essentially meant that ECB measured inflation as an 
overall average, which enabled diverging inflations across Eurozone countries.  
 
Overall, the creators of the EMU expected that the markets combined with other Eurozone Member 
States would punish those countries unable to maintain the inflation and fiscal requirements. 
Furthermore, the creators suspected that the no bailout clause was enough to restrain Eurozone 
countries behavior nonetheless the Eurozone countries experienced quite varying economic 
performances prior to the Euro crisis. (Yiangou et al; 2013: 228)  
3.0 Euro crisis 
The following sections are dedicated to explaining the causes of the Euro crisis but also how the 
financial crisis led to recession in Denmark. Most importantly, that Denmark was affected by the 
financial crisis quite differently than the Eurzone countries. Thus it is important to both have an 
                                                 
5 The next chapter elaborates on Inflation and Price Stability 
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understanding of how economic shocks affected the Eurzone countries and Denmark, because they 
have different economic adjustment mechanism available to them. Thus we do not assume that that 
the financial crisis had the similar consequences throughout Europe. Moreover, we stress that the 
financial crisis had varying effects on Eurozone countries and Denmark, because they had different 
but inter-related exchange systems.   
  
The Euro crisis stems partly from a global recession, speculative behavior within the financial 
markets and structural imbalances within the EMU framework. Deregulation in the global financial 
market during the 1990s and 2000s contributed to increased trade on the inter-banking market with 
increasingly creative financial schemes. The financial sector and in particularly the banking sector 
constructed and acted as intermediaries for various loan schemes, which were considered risk free by 
leading rating bureaus, one of was the subprime loans. This particular loan arrangement enabled an 
establishment of a housing bobble in the US, which burst in 2008 with the bankruptcy of Lehmann 
Brothers, one of the largest investment banks. This also effectuated a freezing of the inter-banking 
market both within the American and eventually the global market, as banks were afraid to lend 
money to each other. In Europe this meant that the European banks began to experience a shortage of 
liquidity, since European banks depended on the American banks on the inter-banking market 
(Jespersen; 2012a: 11). Thus, the banking crisis spread into Europe as European banks lost liquidity 
in the form of US dollars. All this surmounted to a global financial crisis. 
 
The financial crisis changed into an economic crisis as national banks across Europe attempted to fill 
the gap, so to speak, for the European banking sector. To ensure foreign currency National Banks 
across Europe increased their interest rates (ibid., 12), which meant that commercial banks increased 
their interest rates on private loans. This led to a fall in private consumption and private investment 
leading to a negative growth, and an eventual recession across Europe. As a result, unemployment 
increased across Europe as did public sector expenditure and Eurozone countries began having 
difficulties keeping budget deficits below the required 3 percent, especially Southern Euro countries 
(ibid., 12) 
 
The Southern Eurozone countries were also hit by the financial crisis due increasing speculation 
leading to higher interest rates on government bonds and accumulating structural imbalances within 
the EMU framework. Since Eurozone countries cannot print money to cover the rising public deficits 
they are compelled to issue government bonds on the global bonds market, creating foreign debt. 
However, speculation arose as markets began to question whether Greece could repay their foreign 
debt, which in effect led to higher interest rates on Greek government bonds. Consequently, a Greek 
bankruptcy became a possible concern and later for a number of other Southern Eurozone countries. 
 31 
The reason being that differentiated interest rates on the global bond market increased the debt 
burden of those countries (ibid., 12-14). 
   
Debt had been accumulating for number of years for some Eurozone countries; this was primarily 
caused by the difference in the economic policies pursued by Eurozone countries, which can also 
account for why speculation arose for certain Southern Eurozone countries and not Northern 
Eurozone countries. Member States can be divided into two groups; those who prioritized growth 
development and those who prioritized price stability. Within Eurozone countries there has been 
varying living standards, and Southern countries with lower living standards tended to pursue 
economic policies targeted toward economic growth. The two very different economic policies 
increasingly began to show itself on the Eurozone Member States’ balance of payments, in which 
deficits and surplus increasingly became gradually more differentiated between Southern Eurozone 
and Northern Eurozone members. The Southern Eurozone countries sought economic growth, which 
created a higher inflation, and that led to, that they increasingly borrowed abroad to finance their 
budgets. Growth policies were incentivized by the low interest rates set by ECB in the same period 
and enabled by access to international financial markets that considered Eurozone government bonds 
as a risk free investment. On the other hand, Northern Eurozone countries focused toward keeping 
inflation low and made policies to maintain price stability.  (Jespersen; 2012b: 8-14 & Lapavitsas et 
al; 2012: 1-11).  The graph below shows how the difference in fiscal policies showed itself in the 
Member States’ current account balance: 
Source: EU Fagligt (2012), Finanspagten i EU  
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After the Lehmann Brothers failure, the financial markets shifted their behavior in terms of accessing 
economies, which increased the importance of fiscal imbalances and foreign debt. This shift affected 
the EMU framework negatively, in so far that there was an increase of the risk associated with 
interest rates on Greek government bonds compared to for example German bonds. Some Eurozone 
countries’ government bonds, like the German bonds, began to be considered as safe-havens whilst 
others simultaneously were considered highly risky (Hagen et al; 2011). This also meant that those 
European commercial banks that had invested heavily in Greek government bonds experienced a 
second shortage of liquidity. During the initial phase of the crisis ECB had responded by lowering 
the interest rates, thus European Banks seeking to place their surpluses invested in especially Greek 
bonds, which had slightly higher interest rates, to increase their return. Moreover, these bonds could 
be used as collateral in loan acquisitions in the ECB. However, as Greek bonds increasingly were 
considered a high risk investment due to their fiscal imbalances and foreign debt, there 
simultaneously occurred an escape back to bonds that were considered safe, which reflected even 
more negatively on interest rate on Greek bonds, which were souring (Lapavitsas et al; 2012: 1-6 & 
Hagen et al; 2011 & Jespersen; 2012a: 14).  Thus, suddenly the rating attached to various Eurozone 
countries differentiated highly, whereas prior to the financial crisis interest rates across the Eurozone 
had been pretty much the same. The graphs below illustrate the development of the plummeting 
credit ratings in Europe and spcifically how interest rates on Greek government bonds have soared 
since 2010. 
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Source: Hansen et al; 2013:78 
 
 
Source: Business Insider (2013), The Greek Government Is A Prisoner Of The Bureaucracy  
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3.1 Impact on Denmark 
The financial crisis hit Denmark with severity in autumn 2008 primarily due to a shortage of 
liquidity in Danish Banks and a decreasing balance of payments. As most European Banks, Danish 
Banks depended on American dollars provided by the inter-banking market and the freezing of the 
inter-banking market meant that Danish Banks experienced a shortage of liquidity amounting to 500 
billion DKK (Bechmann & Raaballe; 2008: 9). In order to partly secure deposits and partly to 
unfreeze the inter-banking market the government made the Bank Rescue Package 1. Relevant in this 
context is that the state guaranteed all deposits for two executive years. Thus, in order to fill this gap 
the Danish Central Bank increased the interest rate to attract foreign currency, which 
correspondingly increased interest rates in the commercial banks. This however, affected private 
lending negatively, with private borrowing decreasing due to rising commercial interest rates, which 
in return reflected negatively on housing prices. Housing prices decreased, which meant that house 
owners no longer had as much equity in their houses as previously assumed (Bechmann & Raaballe; 
2008: 9-13 & Kureer; 2010: 2.3).   
  
Housing prices had been increasing due to a recovery in the Danish economy in the 2000’s. 
Increasing consumption caused by a combination of wage increases and tax reductions affected 
employment and housing prices positively and this primarily drove the recovery. During 2000’s 
Denmark registered full employment, which occurs when unemployment is below 4 percent (Kureer; 
2010: 2.2). This also had an effect on the balance of payments, which recorded surpluses during 
these years. However, increases in wages also had an effect on competitiveness in so far that it 
increased the unit labor costs.  Labor shortages combined with wage increases led to falling surpluses 
on the balance of payments during 2007-2008. Thus, the financial crisis quickly shifted into an 
economic crisis and by 2009 Denmark recorded 6 percent fall in GDP, the highest since WWII. As a 
consequence of the financial crisis consumption decreased and companies adjusted to the new 
economic circumstance by lowing the labor force. By 2009 unemployment doubled, increasing from 
50.000 to 100.000, significantly increasing the burden of the public welfare system in Denmark. By 
2010 Denmark was running large public deficits partly caused by falling tax revenues, which had 
been accumulating during the late 2000’s and increased social expenditures caused by the increasing 
unemployment (ibid., 2.2, 2.3).  
 
Speculation against the DKK quickly occurred in autumn 2008, and by October 2008 the Danish 
Central Bank were having difficulties in financing the outflow of the DKK, challenging the fixed 
exchange rate against the Euro. Difficulties were fundamentally related to an inability to acquire 
foreign currencies on the capital markets to support the decreasing currency holdings in the Central 
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Bank (Bernstein; 2010: 3-5). According the economic theory, credibility around the pegged 
currencies is in particularly important when economic shocks occur. To fend of speculators ECB and 
US Federal Reserve supplied the Danish Central Bank with liquidity support through a swap 
mechanism. This had a dual effect since it provided the Central Bank with the necessary liquidity 
needed to make a rescue package for the commercial banks but furthermore, the rescue package was 
also an important tool to fend off speculation against the DKK (Vastrup; 2010: 96-101 & Hansen et 
al; 2013: 86-89).  
 
By 2011 the situation had changed, in so far that Denmark was experiencing large inflows of foreign 
capital which was caused by high demand for Danish government bonds. During the financial crisis, 
investors fled from the volatile stock market, which meant that there was increased activity on the 
government bond markets since it was considered safer investments (Altenhofen & Lohff; 2013: 13-
14). As the government bonds market in Euro became increasingly volatile, investors fled to those 
government bonds that were considered “safe”. Investors were incentivized to make such transfers 
because bonds and stocks are considered collateral and therefore affect the investor’s ability to take 
up loans (ibid., 25). The value of  government bonds are thereby affected by their ability to act as 
collateral, and as more Southern European Eurozone countries became increasingly insecure as a 
means of collateral, the price of their government stocks plummeted and interest rates on these bonds 
simultaneously rose.  
 
The Euro crisis affected Denmark by investors fleeing from risky Eurozone government bonds into 
credit worthy bonds like Denmark’s, with an AAA credit rating. Credit worthy countries were 
especially determined by ratings made by important rating bureaus, like Standard and Poors, 
Moodies and Fitch Ratings, who quantified safer countries with AAA, AA, A and lesser with BBB, 
BB, B and so forth (see table below). This large inflow of foreign currency necessitated interest rate 
adjustment from the Danish Central Bank, who lowered their interest rate, making the Danish 
government bonds less lucrative (Hansen et al; 2013: 89-110). Hence, again you could see a variance 
between the interest rate set by Denmark’s National Bank and ECB. 
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Source: The Wall Street Journal (2012) Europe Hit by Downgrades 
 
The low interest rate in Denmark combined with a second bank package (19
th
 January 2009) 
intended to increase lending from commercial banks to the private sector, ensuring favorable 
conditions for the Danish economy, which can be seen in the surpluses on the balance of payments. 
However, public deficits were still amounting with a Government deficit of 413 billion DKK, which 
is equivalent to 23% of GDP (Danmarks Nationalbank, Statens låntagning og gæld; 2011; 2012: 6). 
This was also an indication of an imbalance between government revenues and expenditure and also 
an indicator of Eurozone debt. The sovereign debt crisis led to a volatility of the government bonds 
market in the Eurozone resulting in huge capital flows to Denmark due to the Danish credible AAA 
rating. Moreover, Danish government debt was relatively small compared to other Eurozone 
countries debt, which could possibly explain the stable interest rates on Danish government bonds 
(ibid., 5-7).  
 
3.2 Assessing the differences between Euro and Denmark 
The previous section explained how the financial crisis initially had a greater effect on Denmark than 
the Eurozone countries.  During the initial phases of the global financial crisis the Eurozone 
benefitted from the fact that within the financial markets Eurozone countries’ government bonds are 
valued as risk-free, but as activity increased on the bonds market, structural imbalances between 
Eurozone countries were increasingly differentiated since the bonds were intended as security for 
loans. As Eurozone bonds became increasingly differentiated, especially Southern Eurozone 
countries faced difficulties of liquidity shortage since they could no longer print money. On the other 
hand, Denmark initially faced speculation against the DKK in the wake of the financial crisis. But 
the Danish Central Bank, who was able to increase interest rates, fended off speculation against the 
DKK. Thus, there is a central difference between Eurozone countries and Denmark in so far that 
Denmark still maintains some autonomy in monetary policy. Since the financial crisis, there have 
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been several instances in which the interest rate set by ECB, has either been higher or lower in 
Denmark. Thus the question arises, of whether or not DKK and the Euro are interrelated as we 
attempt to argue that they are. In order to establish a causal relationship between the two it is 
important first to get a theoretical overview of the relationship of a pegged currency and an anchor 
currency. Thus the following section will use OCA theory to explain this somewhat strange liaison. 
 
3.3 Exchange rate systems  
In the world of exchange rates there are two possibilities. One is to have a fixed exchange rate, which 
is the monetary policy pursued by Denmark and the other is to have a flexible currency like Sweden. 
In flexible currencies the rate of the currency is determined by demand and supply. This is 
determined by export and import but also by capital transaction in and out of the country (Jespersen; 
2008: 22). On the other hand, in a fixed exchange rate system you have declared that you plan your 
monetary policy around the promise to keep the rate fixed now and in the future (Grauwe; 2009: 
117). In essence the fixed exchange rate system depends upon the credibility of being able to keep 
this promise, and if the ability to keep the exchange rate fixed is questioned, then currency 
speculation can arise (ibid., 118-119). 
 
Thus, to create credibility surrounding a fixed exchange rate system you have to introduce the notion 
that an eventual devaluation would be too costly. According to theory, if a country abandons this 
system to pursue domestic objectives this would have great real economic consequences especially in 
terms of unemployment. In essence, there exists a positive correlation between employment losses 
and the temptation to leave a fixed exchange system. The greater the temptation to leave a fixed 
exchange system the greater the loss would be to employment within the country (ibid., 120). A 
second mechanism used by countries to create credibility around a fixed exchange rate is to peg your 
currency against another currency. This is a mechanism especially used by smaller countries 
(Hoffmeyer et al; 2000:14). In practice this means that you have to have a holding of the foreign 
reserve that you are pegged to (Grauwe; 2009: 125).  
 
ERMII an exchange rate within the EMU 
Until the referendum in September 2000 the question of “whether Denmark should adopt the Euro or 
not” was at the center of the Danish debate. Among politicians in the Danish Parliament there was a 
clear majority in favor of adopting the Maastricht-treaty with a bill vote in favor 135 to only 25 
against (House of Commons Research Paper; 2000: 7).  However, after the Danish population voted 
“no” to the Maastricht-treaty in June 1992, the Edinburgh agreement declared that Denmark could 
not enter the third stage in the Maastricht-treaty without securing approval in a referendum (ibid., 7). 
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Subsequently, the Danish Government put the Edinburgh Agreement to the Danish electorate in May 
1993 and this time the Danish population voted in favor of ratifying the Maastricht-treaty under the 
terms of agreement (Edinburgh agreement). Following a cautious approach to the skepticism in the 
public, the “yes” side of a majority of center political parties attempted to secure the Euro 
referendum. Even though the “yes” side had the main media support and included political support 
from both the former Danish Prime Minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, and the former opposition 
leader, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, along with the Confederation of the Danish Industry, Danish Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and the Finance Ministry, the result was a “no” with a 53, 2 % majority 
(Økonomiministeriet & Finansministeriet; 2000: 15 & House of Commons Research Paper; 2000: 7-
8, 14). Among other factors, the public was skeptic about giving up sovereignty and feared that this 
could result in a weakening of the welfare system (House of Commons Research Papers; 2000: 17).  
 
3.4.(1) ERMII cooperation 
Thus instead Denmark remained within the ERMII framework, at a relatively narrow band of (+/-) 
2.25. There were several advantages of remaining within the ERMII collaboration whilst maintaining 
a fixed exchange rate; firstly that it serves the interest of countries that would want to limit currency 
fluctuations by entering a fixed-exchange rate agreement. This meant that Denmark could enjoy the 
economic benefit(s) of reducing its exchange-rate costs with the Eurozone countries; while it also 
sends a signal of political commitment to adopt the Euro in the final step of the Maastricht Treaty 
(European Commission, Economic & Financial Affairs; 2012a). Moreover, within ERMII the 
importance of keeping a stable currency without interest rate fluctuation, low inflation and high 
employment could be sustained (Økonomiministeriet & Finansministeriet; 2000: 56). From the 
Eurozone countries point of view, ERMII made sure that the currency fluctuations from countries 
outside the Euro did not interfere with the economic stability in the Eurozone (European 
Commission, Economic & Financial Affairs; 2012a). However, Denmark’s position within the 
ERMII collaboration remains at the discretion of the EMU. The Eurozone countries can decide on 
whether to suspend the ERMII agreement if Denmark or other countries’ economic or political 
situation does not live up to the requirements of keeping a stable DKK with the Euro or a low 
inflation, which means that Denmark has to keep a tight economic policy similar to the Eurozone 
countries (Økonomiministeriet & Finansministeriet; 2000: 90).  
  
The ERMII means that the Danish Central Bank’s monetary objective is to maintain a fixed-
exchange rate with the Euro according to this fluctuation. The ECB and the Danish Central bank is 
obliged to intervene if the fluctuation between the DKK and the Euro is at (+/-) 2, 25 % or more until 
there is equilibrium (Jensen; 2000: 3). However, if either there is a disturbance for the Danish 
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currency situation, and/or there is a simultaneous currency disturbance from other ERM II countries, 
than ECB can solely decide to suspend intervention if it considers it a danger to the main goal of 
price stability or economic stability of the Eurozone countries.  
 
3.4.(2) Consequences of ERMII: 
 
The ERMII has had two significant economic outcomes on Denmark, one being that Denmark like 
Eurozone countries, have less economic instruments to stabilize the economy. One of the main 
Danish consequences of having a fixed-exchange rate is that the monetary policy becomes an 
instrument to stabilize the DKK with the Euro. The exchange rate and monetary policy can therefore 
not be used to stabilize the economy during business cycle upturn or downturn, which means that 
fiscal policy is the only tool left to stabilize the economy domestically. Furthermore, because 
Denmark has agreed to keep a tight budgetary discipline along with other Eurozone countries, the 
Danish Government cannot run a domestic expansionary policy (lowering of taxes) during 
downturns in business cycles, if this proves to be a liability for the budget discipline restrictions 
(European Commission, Economic & Financial Affairs, 2012a). Therefore, Denmark has to use other 
instruments, such as increasing competitiveness (wages/productivity) or limit fiscal expenditure 
(raising taxes or lowering expenditure), to finance the budget. As a consequence of the above 
arguments, the criterion of max 3 % public deficit is from a Keynesian perspective viewed as a bad 
idea because other economic policies, that could otherwise stimulate demand and employment, are 
excluded as a consequence. (Jespersen; 2012b: 12 & Bird; 2012: 5) 
 
 A second consequence of the ERMII cooperation is related to currency fluctuations. A main 
argument against maintaining the current ERM II agreement is that Denmark is exposed to currency 
speculation and increasing interest rates as the crisis has shown (Finansministeriet, Danmark og 
euroen; 2010: 1-2). The point is here that the Danish domestic monetary interest rate is dependent on 
the Euro as a consequence of the ERMII agreement and has to set its interest rate high in times of 
currency uncertainty to protect the DKK (Hoffmeyer et al; 2000: 14). As the financial crisis in late 
2008 and January 2009 demonstrated, the Danish Central Bank was forced to increase interest rates 
to defend the DKK against currency speculation (Finansministeriet, Danmark of euroen; 2010: 1-2). 
In this period, the Danish monetary interest rates increased from 0.35 percent to 1.75 percent and 
notably in January 2009, the percent of monetary interest rate increase was 1.0 % (ibid., 1-2). A 
contributing factor to this was that in crisis times, the capital tends to flow from small economies 
(considered more vulnerable and risky) to bigger economies (considered safer) (ibid., 1-2). This 
meant that when pressure was put on the DKK, as market investors began to speculate against the 
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DKK in the belief that it was going to devaluate
6
, then the Danish Central Bank had to increase 
interest rates according to market expectations in order to protect the fixed exchange-rate with the 
Euro (Jensen; 2000: 4-5 & Finansministeriet, Danmark og euroen; 2010: 1-2). If the Danish Central 
Bank had not increased its monetary interest rate, then a potential decrease in capital inflows could 
have hurt the economy, as foreign investors would have fewer incitements to invest in the Danish 
currency and capital. This is especially important in the case of Denmark which, as a little open 
economy, is vulnerable to changes in foreign capital flows during crisis times and changes of market 
expectations in regard to the political-economic factors (Økonomiministeriet & Finansministeriet; 
2000: 12).  
 
Another point in regard to the Euro crisis and its affect on Denmark is, that high interest rates may 
make a crisis worse, because it becomes more expensive to loan and harder to get the real economy 
going again, since the monetary policy is, as described, limited by the fixed exchange rate agreement 
(Finansministeriet, Danmark og euroen; 2010: 2). This meant while the Danish Central Bank had to 
use its monetary policy instrument to reduce currency speculation; ECB could set its interest rate low 
in order to stabilize the economy in the Eurozone (ibid., 2).  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Since this mechanism is still available in the ERMII agreement. However, adjusting the exchange rate must according 
to the ERMII be done following a common procedure or agreement including all partners of the ERMII including ECB 
and participating countries (Økonomiministeriet & Finansministeriet; 2000: 90)  
 41 
                                   Source: Finansministeriet, Danmark og euroen; 2010:5 
 
3.3.(1) Pegged exchange rate systems  
The consequences of ERMII also related to a discussion within OCA theory on pegged systems, also 
referred to as a currency board. The subsequent section will therefore go over some the theoretical 
consequences of having ERMII, especially with relevance to how credibility is achieved in the 
pegged system. In OCA theory, you can either have a pegged system like ERMII or a ‘full’ 
converged monetary union like the Euro, both systems are considered to create credibility for your 
exchange rates (Grauwe; 2009: 126-130). However, these systems operate very different and 
accordingly, respond differently when shocks occur. In a hegemonic system the pegged country signs 
away its monetary policy and implements interest rates decided upon by the anchoring country. 
Thus, the anchoring country can independently fix is money supply to its real economic needs, whilst 
the pegged country must follow the set interest rate, which might come at a greater real economic 
cost since money stock supply is affected in the pegged country.  
 
If a financial shock occurs in the pegged country, this will ultimately put pressure on the authorities 
to lower the interest rates. This pressure occurs because there is a decreasing demand for money. 
However, if the pegged country is committed to maintaining the same interest rate as the anchor 
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country, there occurs an outflow of capital from the pegged country into the anchor country, because 
according to the theory residents will “seek the higher rate of return” offered in the anchor country. If 
the shock occurs in the anchor country there would occur a capital inflow into the pegged country. 
This would likewise create a pressure on the interest rate since the pegged countries authorities 
would be inclined to increase the interest rate, whilst the anchor country would be inclined to lower 
their interest rate. In a cooperative system countries jointly decide upon the monetary policy but will 
experience shocks differently. This creates a monetary dilemma since the diversity between the 
countries will therefore give varying consequences for the real economics of the countries. Ideally if 
one country experienced decreasing money stocks, the other countries would increase their money 
stocks, essentially leaving the money stock unchanged. However, other countries might not want to 
increase their money stock and decrease their interest rates, since the business cycles in the other 
countries might be impacted (ibid., 130-133). 
3.3.(2) Impacts on the fiscal policies 
Essentially, a country has three economic instruments, which can be used to adjust exchange 
imbalances. Two of these are surrendered in a fixed exchange rate system and more so in a monetary 
union. The first is the control over money stock and the second is ability to set an independent 
interest rate and the third is the countries’ fiscal policies (Hoffmeyer et al; 2000: 52). According to 
OCA theory, monetary unions are required to have similar business cycles and coordinate their fiscal 
policies since a “centralized budget will work as a shock absorber” (Grauwe; 2009: 222).  The reason 
being, that with a centralized fiscal policy, imbalances will be adjusted through redistribution of 
money, thus softening the economic shocks (ibid., 222-223). However, if budgets are not centralized, 
as is the case with the Eurozone, imbalances between the countries are not redistributed.  In this case, 
if one country is hit by a recession this will create budget deficits as the government expenses 
increase, since tax income is decreased and unemployment benefits increases. Thus, the country will 
be forced to borrow abroad to finance its deficits. Moreover, the loans abroad have to be paid back in 
the future. Meaning that, the fiscal policies in the future will have to be adjusted to ensure that the 
debt is repaid.  
 
If capital markets in the monetary union work sufficiently, the debt problem will be considered to be 
an individual countries problem and not a problem of the entire monetary union. Thus, the debt for a 
country that is experiencing deficits will experience a risk premium attachment, while other countries 
will not. The interest rate attached to one country might be higher or lower from another depending 
on the budget deficits or surpluses. Therefore, financing debt in a monetary union will be varying 
and ultimately countries will experience varying real economic consequences, and fiscal policies will 
reflect this (ibid., 233). The only way to change this chain of events is either to reduce spending 
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and/or increase taxes also known as austerity. Thus in a monetary union and a pegged exchange rate 
system fiscal policies “should be used in a flexible way” (ibid., 224).   
4.0 EU response to the crisis 
The previous sections have been dedicated to explaining some the theoretical foundations of the 
EMU and how the final construction of EMU can to look as it does. Moreover, we have presented 
some underlying reasons of the Euro crisis, and related to it is how Denmark was affected by the 
same shock. What is significant in this context is the need to identify the EU response to the crisis, 
and what institutional developments grew out of their attempts to save the Euro. The financial crisis 
and subsequent Euro crisis revealed significant flaws within the EMU construction, but also how 
certain assumptions regarding convergence had been misplaced. With this realization increasingly 
coming to the forefront of the political agenda, there was a creation of new institutions and a transfer 
of competences across existing institutions. Thus the next sections will be dedicated to; firstly 
explaining some of the political dilemmas faced by the political community in the wake of the crisis. 
Secondly, what new institutional developments occurred as a response, and lastly, how certain 
political and economic ideas spread across Europe to become dominating solutions for the Euro 
crisis management. 
    
The response of the Eurozone countries to the sovereign debt crisis was considered slow, mainly due 
to three factors; the first one concerns that, governance through financial market discipline was the 
incentive system built into the original design of the EMU, however, the financial markets showed 
little willingness to punish Member States with debts above the Maastricht criteria (Yiangou et al; 
2012: 228). Financial markets would normally punish certain member states and their government 
bonds by setting the interest rate up, but the Eurozone was seen as one entity with self-correcting 
mechanisms, and therefore, the Eurozone countries, with increasing debt deficits were not punished 
through higher interest rates until the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis.  
 
The second factor considers that, the monetary financing prohibition and ‘no bailout-clause’ did not 
contribute to a self-reinforcing framework, but rather destabilized Member States with rising debt 
levels (de Grauwe in Yiangou et al; 2013: 229). The fact that member states could not receive a 
bailout was thought to be a self-reinforcing way of keeping their ‘house in order’. Nevertheless, in a 
situation with rising debt levels, financial instability and contagion, there was a need for an 
institution that was able to provide sufficient liquidity to member states in financial difficulties, in 
order to assure the bond markets that a default would not happen. This took time, as the idea of 
purchasing Euro area bonds was not compatible with the original design of the EMU and the spirit of 
the monetary financing prohibition.  These events were in particular related to the role of ECB as a 
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central bank. ECB offered little to weak interaction among the EU member states. The ECB operated 
within a one-dimensional measurement primarily targeted toward inflation control. On the other 
hand, the ECB, in its primary operational function, was taking for granted the European economies 
as homogeneous instead of a cumulus of heterogeneous structures, whereas they developed quite 
asymmetric and with diverse features, (Konarzewka; 2006: 76-77, Flam; 2009: 44-46). The figure 
below illustrates the how these mechanisms were supposed to reinforce each other. 
 
 
Source: Yiangou et al; 2013: 227 
 
The third factor entailed, that major fiscal and macro-economic imbalances in some Eurozone 
countries, resulted from unsustainable national polices, which the SGP or BEPG
7
 were not able to 
prevent or correct (Salines et al; 2012: 671). This led to the overall question of whether to save the 
Euro or to throw the ‘bad’ countries out. According to Yiangou, sunk costs (amount of money 
already spent on the EMU) and rising price of exit eliminated the option of inaction, since the 
consequences were perceived as being too severe. The reason being that, inaction would have led to 
a default or exit of some Member States, and the possibility of a break-up of the Eurozone (Yiangou 
et al; 2013: 230). This option was deemed too costly, and therefore, other measures were taken in 
relation to relaxing the monetary financing prohibition. The European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) were created, in order to provide liquidity with 
conditionality (a.k.a. austerity) for countries in financial difficulties.  However, the establishment of 
EFSF and ESM are only of a complementary character, they buy time for the Member States to do 
their homework, but do not solve their problems (Regling; 2012: 4) 
                                                 
7 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines  
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The response on the government bonds market was considered slow. One of the main problems 
identified with the Euro area sovereign debt market, was the potential for investors to neglect certain 
risks, and therefore under-price them (Yiangou et al; 2013: 232). Government bonds of a certain 
credit rating or above were considered risk-free. Furthermore, sovereign debt issued in a bank’s own 
currency was not subjected to a credit rating threshold. Therefore, banks in the Eurozone could buy 
Greek debt and consider them risk-free. That was problematic, since banks could count risk-free 
investments as part of their required liquidity (Steiner, European sovereign debt crisis causes; 2012). 
All this together with speculation on long-term yield spreads led to, Southern European/ Eurozone 
periphery government bonds falling in value and increasing in interest rate. Furthermore, since the 
value of the government bonds depends on the extent to which the bonds can be used collateral for 
loans, it will have an implication on the government yield spread of a given country against the 
German yield spread. The reason being, that as the difference between the market value of the bonds 
and the bonds value as collateral increases, the bonds decrease in value as a guarantee. When that 
happens, the price of the short-term government bonds decreases and the interest rate increases. 
 
In order to assure investors, austerity measures were implemented, which meant limiting government 
expenditure and raising taxes, because public expenditure cuts were considered to be the solution 
‘’falling aggregate demand’’ (Lapavitsas; 2012: 119). The austerity measures were initially 
introduced in Greece, supported by the EU institutions as a condition for receiving bailout funds. 
This quickly became a ‘one size fits all’ kind of solution, with Portugal and Ireland also introducing 
austerity measure to become eligible for a bailout. In other words, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland 
agreed on austerity measures together with Troika, in order to calm the markets from speculating on 
fiscal imbalances, and therefore pressured Member States to introduce austerity measures (ibid., 119-
120). However, this was not enough, since the question of whether government debt would ever be 
paid back was still being speculated on (ibid., 114-123) 
 
In order to save the Euro, other measures were needed. According to OCA theory, fiscal convergence 
is needed. An asymmetrical shock has two implications for how fiscal policy should be managed in a 
monetary union. Firstly, a fiscal union should be constituted by a central budget where fiscal policy 
imbalances will be adjusted through redistribution of money, thus softening the asymmetrical 
economic shocks (Grauwe; 2009: 222-223). Secondly, if there is no budgetary union, then Member 
States should be allowed to use their fiscal policy in a flexible way, allowing the budget deficit to 
increase through built-in budgetary stabilizers (ibid., 224). Hence, the OCA argument is that because 
countries give up their exchange rate and monetary policy, the fiscal policy should either be 
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conducted on a centralized level to transfer and absorb negative demand shocks, or used 
autonomously by Member States (ibid., 224). Thus, the focus on fiscal policy is put on stabilizing 
asymmetrical shocks to prevent countries from entering an unsustainable position that is a liability to 
the EMU. With ever more focus being on the fiscal imbalances of Eurozone countries, with high debt 
levels. The response from the EU was naturally to push forward the idea of centralizing fiscal 
policies, since the use of flexible fiscal policies pursued by member states led to unsustainable debt 
levels. Centralizing fiscal policies was thought to be enough to calm the markets, because the EMU 
would be better off dealing with fiscal imbalances through redistribution of money. 
 
The second argument of the OCA theory has been criticized because an autonomous fiscal policy can 
lead to instability and problems of unsustainable deficits. The sustainability problem is generated by 
increasingly growing public debt (the interest payment on debt) relative to the growth in GDP. If this 
continues annually, then an unsustainable situation occurs where debt accumulates, which can only 
be stopped by either limiting expenditure or raising taxes (ibid., 226). The point here is, that an 
expansionary fiscal policy runs on a budget deficit that has to be refinanced over years and can, thus, 
be problematic to use systematically over years (ibid., 230). Hence, in contrast with the OCA 
argument, the danger of running an autonomous fiscal policy can be that the government finds 
themselves in a position where accumulating debt leads to interest rate increases and eventually a 
default. This unsurprisingly, was the case for several of the Eurozone governments, and since fiscal 
stability plays a greater role in determining credibility on the government bonds market, the Fiscal 
Compact (budgetary union) was initiated. 
 
4.1 Institutional developments as a response to the Euro crisis 
The subsequent section will primarily give an overview of some of the important institutional 
developments that occurred as a result of European sovereign debt crisis. These developments will be 
used to catalyze our analysis and in our examination of spillovers. For that purpose, it could be useful 
to have a clear understanding of what main institutions evolved out of the crisis and with what intent 
they were constructed, which will be a useful approach for identifying functional, political and 
cultivated spillovers.    
4.1(1) European Financial Stability Facility 
Eurozone members created the EFSF in May 2010. The EFSF’s mandate is to safeguard financial 
stability within the Eurozone by providing loan based financial assistance within a framework of a 
macro-economic adjustment program. It is a temporary independent institution remitting of bonds in 
capital markets to assist Eurozone countries facing serious fiscal difficulties (Lapavitsas; 2012: 178). 
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Most notably the EFSF has provided loans for Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Additionally in July 
2012, the instruments for support were widened to include purchase of debt bonds of distressed 
countries in primary and secondary markets.  The EFSF had a lending capacity of €440 billion to the 
member states, of that amount, €211 billion provided by Germany8.  
4.1(2) European Stability Mechanism 
Located in Luxembourg and established on September 2012, the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) is designed to safeguard financial stability within the Eurozone. With a maximum lending 
capacity of €500 billion, the ESM provides access to financial assistance programs for all members 
of the Eurozone experiencing or facing financial trouble. The ESM entered into force on October 8
th
 
2012 and thereby permanently replaced the EU funding program EFSF. All new bailout applications 
and deals for any member state in the Eurozone with financial instability, from now on, are covered 
by ESM, while the EFSF will only continue to handle the previously approved bailout loans for 
Ireland, Portugal and Greece.  
 
In order to apply for ESM bailouts member states must sign a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) creating a framework of required reforms and implementing a program in order to restore 
financial stability. Another precondition for receiving an ESM bailout, which came into force on 
March 1
st
 2013, requires member states to have fully ratified the Fiscal Compact. Once a Member 
State has applied for ESM support, the country in concern will be analyzed and evaluated on all 
relevant financial stability matters by the Commission, ECB and the IMF in order to determine 
whether or not support should be offered and by which means. However, the establishment of the 
ESM should not be regarded as a sole response to the sovereign debt crisis, but rather as 
complementary method with respect to fiscal reforms, with other EU initiatives such as the SGP and 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG).  However, if a Member State within the Eurozone does require financial assistance, the 
ESM will have the capacity and resources to act as a financial backstop and apply a lending 
instrument that will stabilize the financing needs of that country. 
4.1 (3) Bail-outs 
For countries, which are in crisis and need a bailout, they must meet the requirements of the three 
official creditors – the Commission, ECB and the IMF, the so-called ‘Troika’. The requirements are 
usually in the form of austerity measures, which require that government spending and entitlements 
are slashed. The first bailout came in May 2010, as a response to the growing concern that Greece 
would default on its massive debt. The bailout package was in the amount of 110 billion Euros to be 
                                                 
8Germany contributing roughly € 60 billion more than France (the second largest contributor) See, EFSF graph. 
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received over three years. The requirements were that Greece cut budget costs by 30 billion Euros 
over three years (Hewitt, Eurozone approves massive Greece bailout; 2010).  
 
The second bailout came in November 2010, this time to cover the massive debt held by six Irish 
banks. The bailout package was in the amount of 85 billion Euros and came with three requirements 
for the Irish government. First, they had to strengthen and overhaul their banking system. Second, 
had to implement an ambitious fiscal adjustment and reduce their deficit by 2015. Lastly, they had to 
introduce growth-enhancing reforms (Peston, Irish Republic 85bn euro bail-out agreed; 2010).  
 
The third bailout came in May 2011, due to rising borrowing costs, which forced the Portuguese 
government to seek financial assistance (Bugge & Khalip, Portugal agrees on a 78bn euro EU/IMF 
bailout ; 2011). The bailout package was in the amount of 78 billion Euros, and in return Portugal 
agreed to reform its health care system and to start an ambitious privatization program (Flanders, 
Portugal’s 78bn euro bail-out is formally approved; 2011). In July 2011, Eurozone leaders agreed to 
a new package, which included a new 109 billion loan for Greece (European Council, A Common 
Response to the Crisis Situation; 2011). The new package was not only intended to help Greece, but 
also to prevent contagion to other European economies. The package will lower the interest rates on 
the bailouts for Greece, Ireland and Portugal. It also includes various options for Greece’s repayment 
terms and reduces the amount that Greece pays on its loans, whilst allowing private sector 
participation so banks can share the ‘tax payers’ burden. The Package doubles the length of the 
repayment terms for Portugal and Ireland. Furthermore, the EFSF will be granted more powers in 
relation to buying up bonds and making credit available to countries such as Spain and Italy 
(Flanders, Greece Aid Package Boost’s Stock Markets; 2011). The latest bailout is almost in place 
(April 2013). The bailout is in the amount of 10 billion Euros and is designed to prevent Cyprus from 
going bankrupt. At the moment, the German lower house of parliament voted ‘for’ the bailout, and 
the Cypriot parliament is also set to vote on the bailout (Brown, German Parliament Backs Cypress 
Bailout; 2013).   
4.1 (4) The Fiscal Compact 
The fact that Europe was confronted with the deepest economic and political crisis, led to a need for 
a Fiscal Compact (fiscal union) and balanced budget rules, since Member States could not keep their 
‘houses in order’. Hence, the main idea behind the Fiscal Compact is to ensure budgetary discipline 
among Member States (Nahtigal and Bugaric; 2012: 1). On March 2, 2012, twenty-five out of 
twenty-seven member states
9
 of the EU agreed to sign the Treaty on the Stability, Coordination, and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG).  The Treaty generally referred to as the 
                                                 
9 The United Kingdom and the Czech Republic did not sign 
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Fiscal Compact, which came into force January 2013, was adopted under the pressures of financial 
markets, which, since 2008, had been threatening several countries in the Eurozone. The main goal 
of the Fiscal Compact is to foster fiscal discipline, notably in the Eurozone, building on and 
enhancing the reinforced SGP
10
.   
 
The Fiscal Compact consists of two main modules; the first module consists of a balanced budget 
rule including an automatic correction mechanism, while the second module is a strengthening of the 
excessive deficit procedure. Under the first module of the Fiscal Compact, the twenty-five 
contracting member states commit to implement into national legislation, a fiscal rule, which requires 
that general government budgets are in balance or in surplus. In addition the first module requires 
parties to respect a Medium Term Objective (MTO), which is defined by a maximum structural 
deficit of 0,5% of GDP
11
, unless the country has a debt-to-GDP ratio which is significantly below 
60%, the structural deficit is allowed to be 1% of GDP. This is called the “balanced budget rule” and 
must include a correction mechanism, which is automatically triggered in case of deviation. The 
Commission has been given the task of proposing such a mechanism
12
. 
 
Moreover, Member States with debt exceeding 60% of GDP will have to strive to reduce it at an 
average rate of 5% per year of the exceeded percentage points.
13
 Additionally the Commission has 
been ask to prepare a report on compliance. If the Commission concludes in its report that a 
contracting Member State has failed to comply, one or more of the other contracting Member States 
can bring the matter before the ECJ. Independently of a Commission report, any Member State can 
also call upon the ECJ to verify the implementation and compliance of the balanced budget rule and 
the correction mechanism into the national law. The ECJ’s ruling is binding and the affected country 
must take the necessary measures to comply with the ruling within a specified period. Further failure 
of compliance from a specific Member State can lead to the ECJ imposing a penalty payment or fine 
of up to 0.1% of GDP, which will be transferred to ESM. Thus, Fiscal Compact requires balanced 
budget rules in Member States’ constitutions, thereby spreading responsibility for enforcement onto 
national governments, with the Commission also playing an enforcement role (Yiangou et al; 2013: 
232). 
 
Furthermore, the treaty places compliance with its budgetary and other requirements under the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ (Nahtigal and Bugaric; 2012: 1). This can have enormous implications, as 
                                                 
10 See Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
11 The structural deficit is the deficit that remains across the business cycle, because the general level of 
government spending exceeds prevailing tax levels. 
12 TSCG Article 3-1 
13 TSCG Article 4 
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what is important at the European level, in relation to fiscal policies is not necessarily what the 
individual Member State needs. With implementation of the Fiscal Compact, fiscal policies are no 
longer set after national economic conditions, but rather from a European outlook on what suits 
Europe and the Euro best. At the same time, austerity is becoming the prevailing method of attaining 
the Fiscal Compact’s goal of restoring balanced budgets throughout the Eurozone. In other words, 
the European institutions will pressure fiscal discipline through austerity. Before the crisis, the 
realization that, Eurozone countries were not able to monitor or ‘point fingers’ at other Member 
States led to an expansion of the European institution’s competences. The Commission together with 
the ECB will review Member State’s economic trajectories and issue warnings for Member States 
that are not complying with the budgetary requirements, which will lead to enhanced surveillance 
requirements. The EP can sanction a Member State concerned by a Council recommendation, by 
inviting the member state to participate in an exchange of views with a competent committee 
(Salines et al; 2012: 672). 
 
5.0 Analysis  
 
The following section of our analysis will attempt to answer the second research question.  Initially, 
we will determine how market dynamics have led to fiscal imbalances and how pressures of such 
market dynamics have emerged affecting government bonds and interest rates in Europe. 
Additionally we determined in the analytical framework that pressures can occur in the form of, for 
example asymmetrical shocks, financial and market turbulence. We will therefore consequently 
reveal that such emerging pressures of market dynamics have led to spillovers, explained by 
Niemann in section 2.1. The next step involves the task of identifying such neo-functional spillovers 
and determine whether or not cultivated, functional, political or combined spillovers have occurred at 
the EU level thus constituting a fiscal spillover. In order to best navigate towards a feasible answer of 
the second research question, this project identifies three overall tendencies that originate from our 
analytical framework.  
The first tendency this project highlights is the perception of an “incomplete EMU” which stems 
from the response to pressures of the Euro crisis that called for an increasing “need” by key actors 
and policy makers to coordinate centralized solutions to asymmetrical problems within the EMU. We 
explain the transition of a political spillover towards a cultivated spillover by emphasizing the 
creation of the EFSF and the ESM as key examples of an “incomplete EMU” as the ECB was 
incapable of directly providing bail-outs to struggling Member States due to the no-bail-out clause 
Article 125 of the TFEU. The second general tendency we focus on is that with the need of 
centralized solutions to an incomplete EMU, in the wake of the Euro crisis, has consequently led to a 
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“transfer of competences” (from the national to the European level) of new and existing European 
bodies. A prime example in this context is the added competences given to the ECB being able to 
purchase volatile government bonds via the OMT scheme under their preliminary mandate of “Price 
Stability” in order to calm the markets and restore credibility. We consider a third tendency of 
“economic governance” as a natural progression which stems from obtaining additional competences 
at the EU level. The creation of the Fiscal Compact has reinforced the framework of SGP’s fiscal 
policy via the “golden rule” while austerity measures were sought out to be the “one-size fits all” 
solution for achieving the objectives of the Fiscal Compact.    
 
5.1 An Incomplete European Monetary Union 
We argue that in the wake of the crisis there occurred a realization for actors/agents that the EMU 
within its existing format was incomplete. Exogenous pressures in the form of market behavior in 
particular pressured Eurozone Member States to take action, if a contagious effect to the rest of the 
Eurozone was to be prevented. Such a contagion effect could possibly lead to the fall and final 
demise of the Euro. This external pressure incentivized leaders within the Eurozone to seek 
centralized solution as the Euro crisis increasingly deteriorated, which resulted in the creation of 
EFSF and ESM.   
5.1.(1) Exogenous pressure of the markets  
In particular we would like to highlight how market dynamics, especially on the government bonds 
markets, have pressured European policy-makers to facilitate economic coordination according to 
market expectations. Calming down markets has been a primary objective since the inception of the 
Euro crisis. Overall, the market dynamics during the crisis have been very partial toward firstly fiscal 
policy cuts and secondly, deeper consolidations of economic governance at the European level. A 
particular example of this is Spain, where yield spreads against Germany were reduced after the 
announcement of fiscal cuts and European initiatives for enhanced budgetary discipline (Hansen et 
al; 2013:72 &76). Moreover, the problem of not accommodating EU policies according to market 
dynamics became apparent in the Greek case as soaring interest rates on Greek government bonds 
instrumentally increasing the possible likelihood of a Greek bankruptcy. Volatility of the Euro bond 
market spread to neighboring EMU countries and speculation arose around a possible breakup of the 
Euro as a result. This situation proved on the one hand, that the problem was not only a sporadic one, 
and it could turn into a long term one, which required a long term solution instead of a provisional 
one; and on the other hand that the whole EMU structure and even the design and framework of the 
existing European institutions were incomplete to be prepared to cope with the solution to the 
financial crisis, that the Eurozone needed. 
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5.1.(2) Structural limitations to the existing EMU structure 
However, the European Central Bank, has two important limitations regarding economic and 
financial assistance, the first was a no bailout clause, the second is that ECB structural funds are 
limited and specifically intended to assist potential candidate Member States (Beck, The suspension 
of the rule of law in the euro zone and why Chancellor Merkel should not place her trust in rules. 
Part 1; 2012 ).  Thus the creation of the EFSF and ESM are essentially related to the fact that in order 
to prevent Greek bankruptcy and a possible Euro breakup of Eurozone Member States had to create 
new institutions.  Because government bonds are used as collateral for loan and the value of a bond 
depends on its value as collateral. If the ability of a country to pay its interest rates and repayments 
are questioned, yield spreads between countries often arise on the capital market (Altenhofen & 
Lohff; 2013: 25). As expected, markets reacted increasingly negatively to those countries that had 
accumulated massive debt (Hansen et al; 2013: 104).  The first signs that something should be done 
in order to save the euro by means of centralized solutions and political commitments began in 
February 2010. The Heads of State of the Eurozone emitted an urgent official statement in which 
they expressed that 
 “All euro area members must conduct sound national policies in line with the agreed rules. They 
have a shared responsibility for the economic and financial stability in the area”, (Consilium 
Europa, Statement by the Heads of State or Government of the European Union; 2010) 
 with it they invited other important European agents, such as the European Commission, the ECB or 
even international organizations, such as the IMF to a coordinated common work to solve the crisis 
in the Eurozone (Consilium Europa, Statement by the Heads of State or Government of the European 
Union; 2010). Soon afterwards and in the same line of thought, the Prime Minister of Belgium, Yves 
Leterme, stressed the need to create a European Debt Agency with a coordinated approach at the 
European level (Gocaj & Meunier 2013: 242). This affirmation indicates that the leaders of the 
Eurozone sought European solutions to the Euro crisis rather than national solutions. We argue that 
the need to address the Eurozone at a European level also relates to the pressure exerted by the 
markets and changing market behavior during the global financial crisis.    
The reason being that prior to the crisis, yield spreads in EMU were treated similarly by markets and 
fluctuations were consequently few and small.  Hence, a lowering of interest on German government 
bonds would usually cause a lowering of other EMU interest rates (Altenhofen & Lohff; 2012: 36-
39). However, as the global financial crisis unraveled investors fled to the volatile stock market, 
which increased the activity on the government bonds market. Consequentially, according to Hansen 
and Thamsborg (2013), the financial market became more diffused and it was harder to distinguish 
between credit risks for banks and countries, because governments had used government bonds to 
recapitalize the banking sector during the financial crisis (Hansen et al; 2013: 95). Since EMU 
 53 
countries couldn’t print money, the only way to recapitalize their domestic banking sectors was to 
issue government bonds. By doing so they also increased their debt. The first side effects of the crisis 
left a severe imprint in one of the “weaker” countries in the Eurozone, such as Greece and later 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Greece was obliged to ask for bailouts from the European Institutions to 
maintain its financial liquidity and to provide reserves that could sustain its economy. Under this 
primary economic governance step, Greece put in place its first austerity package in February 2010, 
and with the support for the EMU leaders to get a corresponding bailout (Voss, European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis: Overview, Analysis, and Timeline of Major Events; 2013). Even the efforts to save the 
situation in Greece, became worse in the country, and potentially contagious to another Member 
States.  
 
5.1.(3) Saving the Euro  
The above mentioned developments increased the importance of countries’ prognosis, increasing the 
influence of leading rating bureau’s rating projections and interest rates on various government 
bonds. Since 2009 several EMU countries have been downgraded and several Eurozone countries 
have been either on negative ‘watch’ or ‘outlook’ list. These lists reflect the credit-rating bureau 
expectations for a possible downgrade (Hansen et al; 2013: 78).  The markets began to react to fiscal 
imbalances, but also in the case of Spain and France and other countries, where fragile fiscal 
balances could be observed (Fiscal imbalances were punished by higher interest rates; a development 
supported by credit rating bureau’s downgraded several Eurozone countries, such as Spain, Italy, 
Greece and Ireland, due to weak public finances and massive public sector debt. By 2012, there had 
been a contagion effect on other stronger Eurozone countries, like Holland and Germany who had 
both been placed on the negative watch list by Standard & Poors (Hansen et al; 2013: 104).   
According to Jespersen (2012b), the influence of the global capital markets has increased 
significantly during the crisis. The dominance of markets can be observed within European policy-
making where policy-makers increasingly awaited the market responses to their policy initiatives 
(Jespersen; 2012b: 96). Jespersen also highlights how markets have been the judges in assessing 
what a credible fiscal policy should look like. This assessment is supported by Hansen and 
Thamsberg (2013) who argue that European initiatives overall have been positively received by 
capital markets, especially in regard to conferred competences to European institutions (Hansen et al; 
2013: 70-76).  As a result of these developments the ECOFIN Council announced the creation of 
EFSF, the first of several new institutions to cope with the impeding Euro. Therefore, the creation 
EFSF can be seen as a result of a high degree of organization and committed political spillover, 
which turned into concrete new competences resulting in a cultivated spillover. The subsequent 
creation of ESM cemented Eurozone Member States’ pledge to not only save the Euro as a currency, 
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but also the usage of European institutions as an EMU governing central (Gocaj & Meunier; 2013: 
246). Gocaj & Meunier (2013) also highlight how “the EFSF package was first welcomed by 
investors, but the euphoria was short-lived” (Gocaj & Meunier; 2013: 246), they also highlighted 
how debt countries like Ireland and Greece pushed for more permanent European solutions than 
EFSF. Germany was reluctant to pursue permanent solution. Nonetheless, the creation of ESM, as a 
permanent lending institution, was formalized during a Council summit in March 2011 (Gocaj & 
Meunier; 2013: 248).  
Overall, these sections indicate a tendency of Eurozone Member States to seek centralized solutions. 
Domestic actors across the Eurozone began to seek centralized initiatives as they came to realize that 
the debt problems within certain Southern Eurozone countries could not be contained. Market 
pressures consistently pressure the Euro government bonds market, which incentivize various actors 
to seek a European solution.     
5.2 Transfer of competences 
Due to the incomplete structure of the EMU, and as a reaction to the crisis, new institutions arose to 
complement the existing structures. We argue that the transfers of competences to the European 
institutions were primarily driven by interests seeking to maintain and preserve the Euro. However, 
these transfers were also conditioned by the fact that certain countries did not favor a fiscal union. 
Instead they pushed for fiscal convergence and the spillovers reflect these dimensions and processes. 
 
5.2.(1) Interests drives European integration 
As Eurozone countries came to realize that the short term initiatives were insufficient to prevent a 
further deterioration of the Euro on the financial markets, leading actors like Merkel and Sarkozy to 
push for further consolidation at the European level (Gocaj & Meunier; 2013: 248).  According to a 
brief published by Bruegel, the Euro crisis “has led to a recognition that for individual countries, 
participation in the single currency is more demanding than initially perceived” (Pisani-Ferry et al; 
2012: 02). Under the SGP fiscal, financial and structural policies largely remained in the hands of the 
national governments. However, it became increasingly clear that a price stability-oriented monetary 
policy alone is not sufficient for a proper functioning of EMU and that it needed to be accompanied 
by sound policies in other domains. (ECB. 2012b: 81).  
 
Marlene Wind stated in an interview with the Danish paper, Information, how the German national 
interests have been instrumental in shaping the Fiscal Compact (Hebsgaard, Europagten er en sejr for 
tysk økonomisk tænkning; 2011). On one hand, Germany has been reluctant to undertake and pursue 
initiatives that would require Germany to share the debt burden of the Southern Eurozone countries. 
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This is particular evident in statements by Merkel regarding the possible formation of Euro bonds 
“At this time … we’re in a dramatic crisis … euro bonds are precisely the wrong answer. They lead 
us into a debt union, not a stability union. Each country has to take its own steps to reduce its debt.” 
(Czuczka, Merkel Says She Will Resist Market Pressure for Common Euro-Region Bonds; 2011).   
5.2.(2) ‘European’ carriers of integration 
Decision-making bodies within EU have been active agents in redirecting solutions to European 
institutions. Ergo, they have been instrumental for pushing the integration process (Pisani-Ferry et al; 
2012: 03). Leaders of EU institutions, for example, the President of the European Commission M. 
Barroso and the President of the European Council H. Van Rompuy, have been calling to draw 
lessons from the past and to improve the economic governance of the EU by integrating further 
economic policies of the Member States (Vilpisauskas, 2013: 366). 
 
Another prime example of how European institutions have been at the center of driving the recent 
institutional developments can especially be seen in the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) 
government bonds buying scheme. In July 2012 Mario Draghi, President of the ECB declared 
“Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro, and believe me, 
it is enough” (ECB, Verbatim of the remarks made by Mario Draghi: 2012).  This statement was 
followed by an announcement in September of the intention to start a program of purchasing 
Eurozone Member States’ short-term bonds in the secondary market (Vilpisauskas, 2013: 367). This 
initiative significantly changed the previous role of the ECB. Its functions were shifted from the 
ordinary monitoring of short-term interest rates and liquidity management to the improvement of 
normal channels of transaction of monetary policy. The ECB has gradually become active in 
intervening in financial markets with the aim of reducing the costs of borrowing and stabilizing the 
financial system (Vilpisauskas, 2013: 366). Moreover, with the creation of the ESM, the operations 
of the ECB were widened in its presence and deepened in its performance. Broadly speaking the role 
of ECB was transformed from a passive guardian of the SGP rules, into an active advisor and 
decision maker with influence and more concentrated power at the national and supranational level. 
As a result of the crisis and the way the management was handled, the ECB has been redesigned in 
several aspects. What can be concluded from this enhanced management is that the ECB became a 
body with the power and right to impose economic and financial conditions on the Member States 
directly related to the core principles of the SGP (Heipertz; 2005: 996). 
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5.3 Economic governance and the Fiscal Compact 
We argued in the previous sections that the EMU was considered incomplete and that new 
competences were added to the European level in the wake of the Euro crisis. To supplement our 
argument, we point our attention towards the creation of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, or commonly known as Fiscal Compact, as yet 
another prime example of how new competences are added to the European institutions. 
Additionally, we attempt to highlight that the Fiscal Compact projects a sign of economic 
governance, as tight economic policies on the EU level such as austerity, budget discipline, 
implementation and compliance can be observed as a coordinated central response to preserve the 
credibility of the Euro during financial disturbance. Furthermore, the involvement of the 
Commission to evaluate and determine whether national fiscal policies are in line with the Fiscal 
Compact’s objectives and framework, known as the ”golden rule” consisting of management of 
public deficits, debt to GDP and structural deficits will also enforce economic governance at the 
European level. Economic governance in this context is laid out by the European Semester, a six-
month period annually when budgetary, macro-economic and structural policies of Member States 
are coordinated in order to take EU considerations into account at an early stage of their national 
budgetary processes.
14
 We also argue that a cultivated spillover in fiscal management is at play, as 
the ECB, via the Commission, increasingly situate themselves in an advisory role on national 
policies, making the case that the supervision of fiscal policies are managed and interpreted by 
European bodies and not national governments, who in return have to implement recommendations 
of the European institutions. Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, stated in 
2010 that; ‘’the Treaties did not provide instruments to deal with a debt crisis and that the founders 
of the EMU were convinced that the SGP would suffice to keep budget deficits low’’ (Van Rompuy; 
2010: 134). 
As previously clarified, the Fiscal Compact has introduced a very detailed “golden rule” which 
Member States are required to incorporate within their constitutions under the threat of judicial 
action before the ECJ, which can lead to financial penalties.  The “golden rule” significantly affects 
the relationship between executives, legislatures, and courts within the Member States, and, if 
coupled with other recent normative developments in EU law, gives unprecedented powers to the 
                                                 
14 The chronological stages of the European Semester entail; 1. In January, the Commission issues its Annual 
Growth Survey, which sets out EU priorities for the coming year. 2. In March EU Heads of State and Government 
issue guidance for national policies on the basis of the Annual Growth Survey. 3 In April Member States submit 
their plans for sound public finances as National Reform Programmes and Convergence Programmes. 4 In June the 
Commission asses the programmes and provide country specific  recommendations. The Council discusses and 
European Council endorses the recommendations. See, The European Commission, Economic Governance; < 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/priorities/economic-governance/ > 
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Commission to direct and police the budgetary policies of the EU countries (Fabbrini; 2013 :35). 
Moreover, as explained in the preamble of the Fiscal Compact, the possibility for EMU countries to 
receive financial assistance under the ESM will only materialize when a Member State has adopted 
and implemented the Fiscal Compact successfully. The preamble states that;  
 
‘’POINTING OUT that the granting of financial assistance in the framework of new programmes 
under the European Stability Mechanism will be conditional, as of 1 March 2013, on the ratification 
of this Treaty by the Contracting Party concerned and, as soon as the transposition period referred 
to in Article 3(2) of this Treaty has expired, on compliance with the requirements of that Article.’’ 
(T/SCG/en 7).  
 
Additionally, Article 8 of the Fiscal Compact sets up an enforcement mechanism, which authorizes 
contracting Member States to bring cases against other noncompliant Member States before the ECJ, 
and empowers the ECJ to sanction, amounting to fines of 0.1% of a disobedient country’s GDP. In 
this context the Fiscal Compact establishes a legal regime to tighten the budgetary policies of the 25 
contracting nations, with the objective of ensuring fiscal discipline in the Member States as a 
precondition for financial stability in the entire Eurozone. To understand the main essence of the 
Fiscal Compact is in fact an institutionalized high degree of fiscal discipline by means of a well-
structured and systematized fiscal policy. Thus, a well-developed economic governance cultivated 
spillover, is necessary to understand the origin, evolution and implementation of the economic and 
political measures regarding austerity, which stemmed as a political spillover, were the very reason 
of the Fiscal Compact. In the end the main purpose of the Fiscal Compact is the endowment of a 
fiscal union, which in itself is a well-established fiscal spillover.   
5.3.(1) The rise of austerity 
The inclusion of ‘direct European control of national budgetary policy’, conditionality of the 
bailouts, marks a significant shift in European policy-making (Bird & Mandilaras; 2012: 4). Under 
the SGP fiscal policy making primarily reserved as purely national discretionary issue, as long as 
Eurozone countries ‘kept their own houses in order’ (Yiangou; 2013: 229). According to Bird and 
Mandilaras (2012) the Fiscal Compact specifically reflects the German interest of “adopting 
balanced budget laws in order to limit the future accumulation of debt” (Bird & Mandilaras; 2012: 
4). We argue that these changes reflect an overall tendency in which domestic fiscal policies are no 
longer considered a domestic prerogative, but a matter for the supranational institutions. However 
there does seem to be a reluctance of, in particular Germany, to pursue initiatives, which would 
‘spread the difference’, so to speak, to all the Eurozone countries. This could also account for why 
fiscal convergence was pursued rather than a fiscal union. According to OCA, a fiscal union could 
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require those countries with balance of payment surpluses to redistribute their surpluses to those with 
debt. The issue of austerity as economic and political implication has had a profound implication in 
all Member States of the Eurozone. One month after the enactment of the EFSF, on June 7th 2010, 
Germany agreed to implement an austerity package in the country, the gesture was designed to serve 
as a model of fiscal austerity for all Europe, starting with the high political implication, from which, 
according to the German chancellor Angela Merkel, was due to; "Germany as the largest economy 
has a duty to set a good example,"(Spiegel 2010). Decisions on a stricter enforcement of the rules 
governing fiscal discipline and structural reforms as well as the adoption of the Fiscal Compact are 
examples of the German influence. On April 23th, 2013, Angela Merkel insisted that:“austerity is 
part of the solution to Europe's financial crisis.“ (Associated Press, Merkel Insist Austerity as Part of 
Europe’s Cure; 2013). It can be maintained that the muddling through the Eurozone crisis can be 
interpreted as a sequence of strategic decisions coordinated by Germany and ECB aiming at 
preventing full scale market panic, on the one hand, and keeping the pressure and incentives to 
undertake structural reforms for the Eurozone countries and bring their finances into order, on the 
other (Vilpisauskas; 2013: 368). Nobel laureate economist Paul Krugman, additionally claims that; 
“Listen to many European leaders — especially, but by no means only, the Germans — and you’d 
think that their continent’s troubles are a simple morality tale of debt and punishment: Governments 
borrowed too much, now they’re paying the price, and fiscal austerity is the only answer.”  
(Krugman, An Impeccable Disaster: 2011). 
In sum, actors and policy makers alike who advocated for tight fiscal discipline, in relation to the 
Fiscal Compact, appear to have been persuaded by the argument that the fiscal deficits of Member 
States is the main contributing cause of the crisis, and therefore also believe that eliminating such 
deficits will reduce the incidence of the crisis (Bird and Mandilaras; 2012: 8).  The Fiscal Compact 
may appear to be the formal abandonment of the “carelessness” that has marked the first decade of 
the single currency and a move towards austerity measures, meant to deter market fears regarding the 
credibility and sustainability of the Euro. Furthermore, the negotiations of the Fiscal Compact 
resulted in 25 EU members signing the Treaty (the United Kingdom and Czech Republic deciding to 
stay out of this process). Although after the negotiations of the Fiscal Compact, the supranational 
institutions of the EU, such as the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, were 
assigned important roles. (Vilpisauskas; 2013: 369). Though the domestic effects of the “golden 
rule” are likely to vary from one state to another, the Fiscal Compact systematically enhances the 
powers of the EU institutions to direct and police the budgetary policies of EU Member States, thus 
increasing centralization in the EU architecture of economic governance (Fabbrini; 2013: 38). 
Although the Fiscal Compact addresses some of the remaining shortcomings of the existing fiscal 
governance framework, its effectiveness and credibility remains subject to a strict implementation of 
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fiscal policy surveillance by the Commission, and a limited use of political discretion by the Council 
(ECB; 2012b: 93).We argue that, there has been a centralization of fiscal policies, whereby more 
powers are transferred to the European level, leading to a fiscal spillover. We used the Fiscal 
Compact and austerity measures as examples of the “one-size fits all” solutions that emerged from 
such fiscal spillovers. 
 
5.4 Implementation and consequences of the Fiscal Compact in a Danish perspective 
 
The subsequent sections will address the third research question and make an overall assessment in 
regard to the problem formulation. The chapter will primarily concentrate on the consequences of the 
Fiscal Compact and other implications related to the fixed exchange rate agreement.  
This chapter is concentrated into three overall assessments. Firstly, we analyze whether any 
countervailing forces has had an effect on the Fiscal Compact implementation. This is done by 
examining whether the Fiscal Compact changes anything in regard to Danish principles of sound 
policy programme and the ERMII collaboration.    
Secondly, we assess whether any Danish barriers might have been removed due to the Fiscal 
Compact. Thereby we analyze whether the implications of the removal of barriers has had any 
notable effect on Denmark in terms of loss of technical competences. Here the political costs will be 
analyzed in terms of whether the fiscal compact implies a loss of political sovereignty.  
Thirdly, we will address our overall problem formulation by looking at some broader interesting 
possible consequences of the Euro crisis. Here we analyze how the Euro crisis has affected the 
Danish fixed exchange rate agreement. 
 
5.5 Identifying countervailing forces 
 
We argue that the Fiscal Compact does not seem to require significant political or judicial changes 
primarily due to two reasons. Firstly, the principles of sound policy have been part of fiscal policy-
making since Denmark maintained a fixed-exchange rate in ERM in the late 1970’s. Given this, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the Fiscal Compact has passed through the parliament. As Margrethe 
Vestager, leader of de Radikale Venstre, put it:  
 
“We have today sent a strong signal to the world that you can continue to have confidence to the 
Danish economy in the future. The Fiscal Compact is a natural extension of the sound principles of 
economic policy, which successive governments here have followed for many years and which is 
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essential for growth and job creation. A broad majority in parliament supports thus the fiscal pact” 
(Økonomi og Indenrigsministeriet, Folketinget vedtager Danmarks deltagelse I finanspagten; 2012) 
 
Magrethe Vestager expresses in this quote a viewpoint that the Fiscal Compact and sound budgets is 
a “natural extension of Danish economic sound principles”, which is commonly expressed in 
economic and political forums. These budget principle are for example carried out in commission 
reports, such as the reports carried out by economic council
15
, who has stressed the importance of 
‘sound policy’ management in terms of structural reforms on the labor market (Thygesen 2012: 69). 
To give a political example of this point, a central topic in the election in 2011 was sound policy 
management of government spending by maintaining a stable fiscal policy in line with 2020 goals 
(ibid: 69).  
Vital elements in the Fiscal Compact, such as the balanced budget rule, has been a normal practice in 
Denmark for decades and the Fiscal Compact is a confirmation of already existing practices within 
Danish fiscal policy-making. In this regard, Denmark has gained better balance on the budgets in 
municipalities and regions and has worked on a budget law to control the expenses. This is 
confirmed by analysis of the Commission and OECD where Denmark is considered as a pioneer in 
terms of fiscal policy stability (ibid: 69).     
Denmark has through the convergence stages been bound by the SGP requirement mentioned in 
section 2.4(2) and as mentioned previously, the Fiscal Compact does not change the existing SGP 
requirements (Economic and Financial affairs, Economic and monetary union; 2012b).  
To summarize our argument, the implementation of the Fiscal Compact in the parliament did not 
change a lot of already existing fiscal practices. Denmark has a record of maintaining ‘sound 
policies’ in terms of the budgetary requirements formulated in the SGP to maintain macroeconomic 
credibility, which is an indicator that the costs of implementing the Fiscal Compact are considered 
low according to the common practice. However, it should be noted that the Fiscal Compact did 
create a political reaction by Enhedslisten and Dansk Folkeparti who pushed for a referendum. 
However, the Danish Ministry of Justice published a note ruling that the Fiscal Compact did not 
involve the giving up of sovereignty, and therefore the request for a referendum was annulled. The 
Fiscal Compact was subsequently passed in the parliament (Justitsministeriet, Finanspagten udløser 
ikke folkeafstemning efter grundloven; 2012 & Astrup, DF og Enhedslisten vil have Finanspagt til 
folkeafstemning; 2012).  
5.6 Political costs of fiscal spillovers 
 
                                                 
15 Økonomisk råd 
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The political centralization of economic governance does have a significant consequence for 
Denmark. The cost of not being a part of the Euro is related to how the Fiscal Compact has brought a 
form of centralized fiscal policies, which is problematic for Denmark because they are politically not 
represented in central economic and monetary bodies within the EMU institutional framework.  
The Europe 2020 goals and the national reform programme in the European semester are examples 
of a political centralization of economic governance that emphasize new restraints on domestic fiscal 
policy management. The Euro 2020 is established to coordinate economic goals centered on growth 
and new governance structures and processes (European Commission, Europe 2020 in a nutshell; 
2013). Every year through the European semester, the Commission sets up a cycle of economic 
policy coordination. In principal, fiscal policies of individual Member States must be given a ‘green 
light’ from the Commission before they can be pursued. During this process the Commission 
undertakes detailed analysis of Member States’ programs for economic and structural reforms and 
sends recommendations for the next 12-18 months (European Commision, Making it happen: the 
European Semester; 2012) If these country specific recommendations are not dealt with within the 
given time frame, policy warnings are issued. In this case, the transfer of competences means  that 
Member States can put other “irresponsible” Member States before ECJ. However, the new 
competences give considerable more enforcement competences to EMU institutions to ensure that 
such deficits do not occur again. The expansion of economic governance processes gives further 
competences to EMU actors who monitor and sanction the Member States if they do not follow these 
recommendations, which puts restraints on fiscal policy management in Denmark. This is 
problematic for Denmark who does not sit at the Eurogroup table which coordinates central 
economic governance objectives.  
 
 
5.7 Loss of political sovereignty 
The Fiscal Compact implies a loss of political sovereignty both in regard to maintaining an 
independent fiscal policy and mandate to deciding budgets independently of EMU (loss of political 
sovereignty). This should not be confused with the judicial loss of sovereignty mentioned earlier.  
Consequentially, Denmark can no longer pursue effective economic politics or expansive fiscal 
policies in case of a crisis, since the Fiscal Compact states that that deficits are only for a limited or 
temporary time (Jespersen; 2012b: 96 & Lund, Finanspagten I EU; 2012). An expansive policy 
essentially requires Denmark to run budget deficits in order to stimulate demand by the increase of 
public investments.  
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5.8 Loss of political influence in leading political decision-making bodies 
In 2010 the former Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, stated that:  
’’Vi kan vælge mellem en fastkurspolitik med indflydelse ved at være med i euroen eller en 
fastkurspolitik uden indflydelse ved at stå uden for euroen. Danmark bør være med i euroen, fordi 
det økonomisk koster os at stå udenfor, men først og fremmest, fordi det politisk er et stort tab af 
indflydelse at stå udenfor.’’ (Jonshøj, Fogh åbner for afstemmning om euroen I 2010; 2009) 
In this quote the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, explains that the main costs of the 
euro opt out is the loss of political influence. According to a report published by DIIS a significant 
consequence of the Danish EMU opt-out is the lack of influence in EMU economic policies. This 
does not mean that Danish officials are excluded from all macroeconomic coordination in EMU, but 
rather that they are excluded from a few relatively important decision making forums (DIIS; 2008: 
186). These decision making forums include the Governing Council of ECB and the informal 
Eurogroup meetings. 
We argue that the exclusion of Denmark in these decision-making forums means that Denmark has 
no influence in central bodies of the EMU economic and monetary areas.  
As mentioned in previous sections, the Eurogroup has played an important role during the crisis and 
has been a central actor in the integration process. This has also been recognized by former Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh who stated that, the greater role the Eurogroup plays, the greater the political 
costs are for Denmark in terms of the Euro opt-out situation (Jonshøj, Fogh åbner for afstemmning 
om euroen I 2010; 2009). 
The Eurogroup is a central forum within economic governance, which consists of the finance 
ministers of the euro area. Decisions taken by the Eurogroup can have implications for the EU as a 
whole and adds to the political costs of remaining outside the euro area (Wallace and Polack; 2010: 
174). The Eurogroup establishes a shared position on a given topic the day before the ECOFIN 
meetings in informal meetings (DIIS; 2008: 226) where the Commissioner for economic and 
monetary affairs and the president of ECB are invited (Wallace and Polack; 2010: 174). The 
Eurogroup importance has grown and is now discussing issues of relevance for non-euro countries as 
well, such as the fiscal compact. An article in Politikken specially highlights:  
“ Eurolandene vil holde to topmøder om finanspagten årligt, men da pagten kun er obligatorisk for 
de 17 eurolande, har ikke-eurolandene ikke fuld adgang til alle beslutninger om pagten og vil kun 
blive inviteret med til ét topmøde om året.’’ (Kristiansen, Fakta: Her er EU’s finanspagt; 2012). 
In effect, the importance of ECOFIN has decreased as initial discussions happen in the Eurogroup 
where collective positions are discussed by the Eurozone finance ministers and brought to the 
ECOFIN meetings where they are voted on. Additionally, some euro area finance ministers do not 
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even show up to the ECOFIN meetings. Hence, Denmark’s possibilities to influence the general 
economic path are reduced as a consequence of the Fiscal Compact and other economic governance 
mechanisms. This is a consequence for the Danish policy-makers because of limited political 
influence to safeguard Danish interests, such as ensuring a strong welfare system.  
5.8.(1) Possible loss of welfare 
The Danish government has initatied a number of welfare reforms and plans are initatied to conduct 
more cuts on expenditure. According to a report from the Danish economic council on the new 2020 
plan will lead to a permanent lower public spending in the future (Hellemann & Garliel; 2012: 101). 
This report also accentuates how the 2020 plan includes a number of welfare reforms among others a 
tax reform, reform of the disability pension and the flex scheme and the introduction of a budget law 
(Helleman & Garliel; 2012: 104).  
In 2012 the budget law was passed in the Danish parliament which effectively put a limit on public 
spending in the state, regions and municipalities through a four year period. According to an article 
in Børsen and data from ‘Folketinget’, the budget law has to be seen in extension to the Fiscal 
Compact (Ritzau, Regering får aftale om budget i hus; 2012 & Folketinget Documenter, 20 
spørgsmål S 2059 Om EU’s finanspagt; 2012). Specifically, the budget law was created to support 
‘’Budgetloven vil med indførelsen af tre separate udgiftslofter for henholdsvis stat, kommuner og 
regioner være med til at understøtte, at de offentlige udgifter udvikler sig inden for rammerne af de 
mellemfristede planers målsætninger for den offentlige saldo’’ (Økonomisk Råd; 2012: 12). This 
reform development within Denmark is very much in line with the statement by Nahtigal and 
Bugaric that:  
“Austerity measures are usually accompanied by other measures—most notably, structural reforms 
that include the labor market reform in the direction of further flexibility of the labor market, 
liberalization of the European market of products and services and other measures of market 
liberalization. Among Member States that are still making efforts to preserve the remaining parts of 
the welfare protection for employees, structural reforms generally present the last measures in 
reducing the labor unit costs: the reduction of the remaining standards of social safety in the case of 
unemployment, medical, health, pension and other welfare protections” (Nahtigal & Bugaric; 2012: 
12)  
5.9 Economic consequences 
In this section we argue that maintaining a stable fiscal policy is fundamental to keeping a credible 
fixed exchange rate. The financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis revealed that the ERM II 
agreement provides an unstable platform for Denmark during financial turbulence or changes in 
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market dynamics where the ERM II agreement between the Danish Central Bank and the ECB is 
challenged.  
 
We have identified two interesting economic consequences in terms of the Danish exchange rate 
agreement. These can be divided into two events of fixed exchange rate consequences; the interest 
rate- spread consequences in the financial crisis, which challenged Danish exchange rate agreement, 
and the interest rate-spread as a result of the sovereign debt crisis. In relation to the former event, the 
financial crisis led to speculation in regard to the Danish fixed exchange agreement and resulted in 
an interest rate-spread increase between the ECB and Danish Central Bank as investors fled from 
Danish financial institutions to safer havens. On the other hand, the sovereign debt crisis pushed the 
Danish interest rates down as market investors saw Denmark’s financial institutions as safer 
considering the previously mentioned triple AAA rating [see section 3.1 in the analytical 
framework], which again created an interest rate-spread between ECB and the Danish Central Bank. 
These events show that the international financial situation has a considerable and unpredictable 
effect on a small open economy like Denmark, which puts pressure on Denmark to maintain 
credibility around the fixed exchange rate agreement and the DKK. Thus credibility around the 
fixed-exchange rate policy involves maintaining credibility in other policy areas such as running a 
“responsible” fiscal policy.    
    
5.9.(1) Financial crisis example: Credibility of the DKK challenged 
The vulnerable position of Denmark in the financial crisis is a direct consequence of the free 
movement of capital and the fact that Denmark is a little open economy dependent on outside market 
changes and rise in interest rates. Therefore, the Danish Government could not do anything when the 
crisis suddenly hit and foreign interest rates increased, which meant that the Danish authorities faced 
a problem of a private bank sector that had increasingly expanded loans to households and firms 
creating a Danish debt crisis (Østrup; 2010: 10). In this case a key factor for the Danish Central Bank 
was the ECB and US Federal reserve (FED) who helped the Danish Government by providing 
liquidity assistance, resulting in limited effects on the Danish Central Bank interest rate (Vastrup 
2010: 98). Accordingly, the FED and ECB helped the Danish Central Bank by offering liquidity in 
Euros and Dollars in a time where the interbank market had stopped functioning, which enabled the 
Danish Central Bank to intervene (buying Euros and Dollars for Danish kroner) by FX swaps 
(Bernstein 2010: 2-4).  The pressure on the DKK meant that the fixed exchange rate promise was 
challenged by speculation on whether Denmark was able to keep its fixed-exchange rate policy or 
not and in this case, credibility was not fully present (Vastrup 2010: 98).  
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The pressure on the DKK occurred when ECB’s allotment rate (ECB main refinancing operations) 
exceeded the Danish Central Bank lending rate by 39 basis points (Bernstein 2010: 2). In October 
2008 the pressure on the DKK led the Danish Central Bank to increase interest rates by 0.4 
percentage point on the 7
th
 October, while ECB the following day reduced its interest rate by 0.5 
percentage point (Bernstein 2010: 4). In this case the Danish Central Bank was forced to increase the 
interest rate in order to regain the confidence of market investors and fund the huge deposit deficits 
in Danish private banks. However, the increase in the interest rate led to more speculation as it was 
interpreted by outside investors as a sign of weakness that, the Danish state financed the shortage of 
credits in Danish banks. Moreover, it was problematic in a time where the financial sector of 
Denmark needed the support of low interest rates (Bernstein 2010: 4).  
 
 
 
 
Additionally, the Danish exchange rate agreement limits the Danish possibility of using fiscal policy 
actively because Eurozone members, in opposition to Denmark, are not responsible for their own 
currency, but has instead a common responsibility to maintain currency stability with ECB as a safe 
guarantee to help the financial sector in the Eurozone. Hence, if Denmark joins the euro, it would be 
guaranteed a greater liquidity support by ECB in times of financial turmoil and could therefore run 
its fiscal policy more freely. Consequently, Denmark would not have its own currency, interest rates 
and capital reserves to worry about (Vastrup 2010: 99). 
Thus the aforementioned swap line and operations of ECB helped stabilize the Eurozone, and it was 
a key factor that the Danish fixed exchange rate was dependent on. This helped stabilizing the 
pressure on the DKK in a time where Danish reserves in the Danish Central Bank where minimal, 
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along with other initiatives such as the Danish government guarantees for loans in Bank Rescue 
Package 1, [see analytical framework section 3.1 impact on Denmark] which altogether helped 
ensure the credibility of the Danish fixed exchange rate policy (Bernstein 2010: 4-5). 
 
5.9. (2) Implications of Interest spread pressures during the sovereign debt crisis  
The sovereign debt-crisis revealed how the prospects of a probable scenario of one defaulting 
Member State created questions regarding the sustainability of other countries and increased the 
burden of those countries (the contagion effect). We argue that this has resulted in a huge capital 
inflow and consequential low interest rates in Denmark [see fiscal spillover section 2.2.3 analytical 
framework].  
According to an OECD report about ‘solving the financial and sovereign debt crisis’ the adoption of 
the Euro and causal lack of adjustment mechanisms has led to the current crisis situation:  
“The difficulty and sometimes inability of some EU counties to borrow for fear of default has led to 
illiquid sovereign markets and severe moves in spreads – with default probabilities being built into 
bond rates in the absence of monetisation and currency adjustment mechanisms.” (OECD; 2012: 
16).  
Thus the risk involved in borrowing as a result of lack of adjustment mechanisms in the EMU has 
caused a severe move in spreads. This was because the creation of the Euro led investors to believe 
that the risk involved in cross-border investments in Europe were eliminated (Krugman 2012: 7), 
indicated in the graph bellow. Accordingly, the last two years interest spread on bonds similar to the 
pre-euro pattern, reflecting the chance of the Euro fracturing and the contagion effect (OECD; 2012: 
16). This in turn has led to an increase of capital flows to Denmark resulting in a negative interest 
spread between the Danish Central Bank and ECB (Danmarks Nationalbank 2011: 6). 
Thus in the sovereign debt crisis, it has been beneficial for Denmark to be outside the Euro in terms 
of private investments and credibility around the DKK and fixed exchange rate policy. The market 
investments and the AAA credit rating has in this case been beneficial to stimulate the Danish 
economy and caused a lowering of loan costs for the Danish state (Danmarks Nationalbank 2013: 3) 
as the Commission states: 
"The credibility of the Danish economy is also reflected in the fact that Denmark has kept the highest 
credit rating throughout the crisis." (Denmark’s Convergence Programme; 2013: 17)   
“However, the increase of investments and capital flows since autumn 2011 has also forced the 
Danish Central Bank to intervene 91 billion DKK and resulted in historic low interest rates to 
maintain the Danish currency stability against the Euro, thereby limiting incentives for market 
investments in Danish bonds (Jørgensen & Risbjerg; 2012: 57).  
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5.9. (3) Sub conclusion: 
 
As mentioned in the analytical framework, the Danish (ERM II) depends on the promise of the 
pegged country (Denmark) to maintain a fixed exchange rate with the anchor country. This outline in 
the analytical framework proved helpful to understand the relation between the fixed exchange rate 
and implementing fiscal constraints.  
The example of the financial crisis highlights why it is essential for Denmark to run a credible fiscal 
policy. Denmark ran into big problems of currency speculation as a result of an expansive fiscal 
policy up till the financial crisis. As a result a liquidity shortage among Danish banks at 500 billion 
DKK and an international frozen bank market led to speculations against the DKK. In such 
situations, Denmark can risk standing alone without help from either the FED or ECB because the 
financial capital flows has a tendency to go from small economic countries to large economic 
countries (or regions) with “safer” currencies. This is because Denmark, in contrast to other 
Eurozone countries, has its own currency to worry about and constitutes a small open economy. 
Therefore, Denmark is highly susceptible to fluctuations in international capital flows, and fiscal 
policy is the only instrument left to ensure a credible fixed-exchange rate. Thus, adopting restraints 
on fiscal policy, like the Fiscal Compact, helps defend the DKK in times of financial turmoil. 
 
The Sovereign debt crisis showed the opposite effect; when the accumulating debt of certain 
countries became a risk of default and fracturing of the Euro, capital flows fled into Denmark 
creating a pressure to lower interest rates in order to maintain a fixed exchange rate agreement. This 
was because Denmark has a credible AAA rating and a history of “sound policy” fiscal principles, 
which is perceived as credible on the international financial market.  
  
 68 
6.0 Conclusion 
 
Throughout this project we have attempted to determine how Denmark is affected by the current 
European sovereign debt crisis through the fixed exchange rate agreement. The findings of this 
project support the idea that an integrated contemporary analysis of the economic and political 
developments provides the best platform for understanding how Denmark is affected by the Euro 
crisis. This is because Denmark, as a little open economy, is highly susceptible to changes in 
international capital flows and changes in the Eurozone.  
One of the more transparent findings that emerged from this study is that the Danish ERM II 
agreement entails that the main objective of the monetary policy is to maintain a fixed exchange 
against the Euro in coordination with the ECB.  
A major finding in this context implies that Denmark is dependent on maintaining a credible fiscal 
policy in times of financial turbulence where the Danish currency is challenged by speculation and 
the free movement of capital flows. Similarly, a central theme in our analysis is how the financial 
market pressures can lead to problems of credibility in the Eurozone creating a general concern that a 
default will result in a Euro fracture. These events have pressured Member States and EMU decision-
makers to find centralized solutions to the credibility problem as the vulnerability of Southern 
periphery countries makes the Euro more risky for market investors. Though the Fiscal Compact, to 
date, has not presented major implications for Denmark, the evidence from this study suggests that 
the centralized solutions has had an effect on the Danish exchange rate policy; namely due to the 
limited political influence in the decision-making process in relation to economic governance in the 
Eurogroup and the limited influence on setting interest rates in the Governing Council.  
The limited political influence on how ECB sets the interest rates can cause problems for Denmark 
staying within the interest rate-spreads and shortage of liquidity support in times of uncertainty 
surrounding the Danish currency. Moreover, the centralization of economic governance and lack of 
influence in the Eurogroup means that a loss of sovereignty has been observed in regard to how 
Denmark runs its fiscal policy. Hence, the loss of political influence implies that Denmark has little 
room to navigate through when deciding how to run a credible fixed-exchange rate policy, presenting 
a challenge of projecting credibility and maintaining an AAA credit rating while staying the course 
amid financial turbulence. 
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